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Social norms and choice: a weak folk theorem for repeated matching games

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  • Kevin Hasker

Abstract

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  • Kevin Hasker, 2007. "Social norms and choice: a weak folk theorem for repeated matching games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(1), pages 137-146, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2007:i:1:p:137-146
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-007-0078-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dutta Prajit K., 1995. "A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 1-32, June.
    2. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1991. "On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 428-438, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016. "Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-23.
    2. Luciana Cecilia Moscoso Boedo, 2009. "Labels for Misbehavior in a Population with Short-Run Players," Working Papers DTE 468, CIDE, División de Economía.
    3. Deb, Joyee & Gonzalez-Diaz, Julio, 2019. "Enforcing social norms: Trust-building and community enforcement," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Repeated games; Matching games; Social norms; Folk theorem; C72; C78; C79;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

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