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The Tragedy of the Commons in a Violent World

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  • Petros G. Sekeris

    () (Center for Research in the Economics of Development, University of Namur)

Abstract

Earlier research has shown that the tragedy of the commons may be resolved by Folk theorems for dynamic games. In this article we graft on a standard natural-resource exploitation game the possibility to appropriate the resource through violent means. Because conflict emerges endogenously as resources get depleted, the threat supporting the cooperative outcome is no longer subgame perfect, and thus credible. The unique equilibrium is such that players exploit non-cooperatively the resource when it is abundant and they revert to conflict when it becomes scarce. The players' utility is shown to be lower even if conflict wastes no resources.

Suggested Citation

  • Petros G. Sekeris, 2012. "The Tragedy of the Commons in a Violent World," Working Papers 1213, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:nam:wpaper:1213
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. “The Tragedy of the Commons in a Violent World,” P. Sekeris (2014)
      by afinetheorem in A Fine Theorem on 2014-08-13 20:12:24

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    Cited by:

    1. De Luca, Giacomo & Sekeris, Petros & Spengler, Dominic, 2015. "Can Violence Harm Cooperation? Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 63697, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. François Libois, 2016. "Success and Failure of Communities Managing Natural Resources:Static and Dynamic Inefficiencies," Working Papers 1601, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
    3. Rodriguez Acosta, Mauricio, 2016. "Essays in political economy and resource economic : A macroeconomic approach," Other publications TiSEM 1e39ef1b-43a2-4f95-892c-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tragedy of the Commons; Conflict; Dynamic Game;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation

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