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On the Measurement of Success and Satisfaction

Author

Listed:
  • René van den Brink

    (VU University Amsterdam)

  • Frank Steffen

    (The University of Liverpool Management School)

Abstract

This discussion paper led to a chapter in .Voting Power and Procedures: Essays in Honour of Dan Felsenthal and Moshé Machover', (eds. R. Fara, D. Leech, and M. Salles), pp 41-64, 2014. The main purpose of the present paper is to disentangle the mix-up of the notions of success and satisfaction which is prevailing in the voting power literature. We demonstrate that both notions are conceptually distinct, and discuss their relationship and measurement. We show that satisfaction contains success as one component, and that both coincide under the canonical set-up of a simultaneous decision-making mechanism as it is predominant in the voting power literature. However, we provide two examples of sequential decision-making mechanisms in order to illustrate the difference between success and satisfaction. In the context of the discussion of both notions we also address their relationship to different types of luck.

Suggested Citation

  • René van den Brink & Frank Steffen, 2012. "On the Measurement of Success and Satisfaction," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-030/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20120030
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nevison, Christopher H., 1982. "Structural satisfaction in simple games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 397-401, December.
    2. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2005. "Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(1), pages 171-197, January.
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    5. René Brink & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Frank Steffen, 2013. "Measuring power and satisfaction in societies with opinion leaders: an axiomatization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(3), pages 671-683, September.
    6. Madeleine O. Hosli & Moshé Machover, 2004. "The Nice Treaty and Voting Rules in the Council: A Reply to Moberg (2002)," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 497-521, September.
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    8. René van den Brink & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Frank Steffen, 2009. "Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: Dictator and Opinion Leader Properties," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-052/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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