IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jcmkts/v42y2004i3p497-521.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Nice Treaty and Voting Rules in the Council: A Reply to Moberg (2002)

Author

Listed:
  • Madeleine O. Hosli
  • Moshé Machover

Abstract

This response to Moberg (2002) demonstrates that some of his figures and calculations require more thorough analysis. His dismissal of the risk of inertia in the Council after enlargement, his measurement of blocking power of individual EU states and his figures on relative under‐ and over‐representation of EU states in the Council are disputed. The article pleads for a dialogue between academics and practitioners in order to avoid random outcomes and ad hoc deals, such as those resulting from the political bargaining during the 2000 Nice summit meeting. Sound expert advice on voting rules and their effects is desirable for achieving more transparent, equitable and sensible institutional solutions, and allocation of voting weights and seats in the EU Council and Parliament.

Suggested Citation

  • Madeleine O. Hosli & Moshé Machover, 2004. "The Nice Treaty and Voting Rules in the Council: A Reply to Moberg (2002)," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 497-521, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:42:y:2004:i:3:p:497-521
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0021-9886.2004.00516.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0021-9886.2004.00516.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.0021-9886.2004.00516.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dan S Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2004. "Analysis of QM rules in the draft constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention, 2003," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 23(1), pages 1-20, August.
    2. Baldwin, Richard & Berglöf, Erik & Giavazzi, Francesco & Widgren, Mika, 2000. "EU Reforms for Tomorrow's Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 2623, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jan‐Erik Lane & Reinert Maeland, 2006. "International Organisation as Coordination in N‐Person Games," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 54(1), pages 185-215, March.
    2. Federico Valenciano & Annick Laruelle & Ricardo Martínez, 2004. "Success Versus Decisiveness: Conceptual Discussion And Case Study," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-30, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    3. Ines Lindner, 2012. "Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano: Voting and collective decision-making," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(1), pages 161-179, January.
    4. František Turnovec, 2008. "National, Political and Institutional Influence in European Union Decision Making," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(2), pages 154-173, September.
    5. René van den Brink & Frank Steffen, 2012. "On the Measurement of Success and Satisfaction," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-030/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. Serguei Kaniovski & Sreejith Das, 2015. "Measuring voting power in games with correlated votes using Bahadur’s parametrisation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(2), pages 349-367, February.
    7. Zhi WANG & Shangjin WEI & Kei-Mu YI, 2009. "Value Chain in East Asia Production Network -An International Input-output Model Based Analysis," EcoMod2009 21500090, EcoMod.
    8. Peter Roozendaal & Madeleine Hosli & Caspar Heetman, 2012. "Coalition formation on major policy dimensions: The Council of the European Union 1998 to 2004," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 447-467, December.
    9. Matthew Gould & Matthew D. Rablen, 2019. "Are World Leaders Loss Averse?," CESifo Working Paper Series 7763, CESifo.
    10. Thomas König & Bernd Luig, 2014. "Ministerial gatekeeping and parliamentary involvement in the implementation process of EU directives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 501-519, September.
    11. Madeleine O. Hosli & Běla Plechanovová & Serguei Kaniovski, 2018. "Vote Probabilities, Thresholds and Actor Preferences: Decision Capacity and the Council of the European Union," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 31-52, June.
    12. Madeleine Hosli & Rebecca Moody & Bryan O’Donovan & Serguei Kaniovski & Anna Little, 2011. "Squaring the circle? Collective and distributive effects of United Nations Security Council reform," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 163-187, July.
    13. Loek Groot & Erik Zonneveld, 2013. "European Union Budget Contributions and Expenditures: A Lorenz Curve Approach," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(4), pages 649-666, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kauppi, Heikki & Widgren, Mika, 2007. "Voting rules and budget allocation in the enlarged EU," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 693-706, September.
    2. Matthew Gould & Matthew D. Rablen, 2013. "Equitable Representation in the Councils of the United Nations: Theory and Application," CEDI Discussion Paper Series 13-07, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University.
    3. Le Breton, Michel & Montero, Maria & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2012. "Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 159-173.
    4. Seppo Honkapohja & Frank Westermann, 2009. "Rethinking Subsidiarity in the EU: Economic Principles," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Seppo Honkapohja & Frank Westermann (ed.), Designing the European Model, chapter 10, pages 331-365, Palgrave Macmillan.
    5. repec:kap:iaecre:v:15:y:2009:i:4:p:393-408 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Hefeker, Carsten, 2004. "Uncertainty, Wage Setting and Decision Making in a Monetary Union," HWWA Discussion Papers 272, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
    7. Julien Reynaud & Fabien Lange & Łukasz Gątarek & Christian Thimann, 2011. "Proximity in Coalition Building," Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, vol. 3(3), pages 111-132, September.
    8. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2006. "The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 129-154, August.
    9. Widgrén, Mika, 2008. "The Impact of Council Voting Rules on EU Decision-Making," Discussion Papers 1162, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    10. Widgren, Mika & Kauppi, Heikki, 2008. "Do Benevolent Aspects Have Room in Explaining EU Budget Receipts?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6778, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Zaporozhets, Vera, 2015. "Power Distribution in French River Basin Committees," TSE Working Papers 15-558, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    12. Mika Widgren, 2003. "Power in the Design of Constitutional Rules," European Economy Group Working Papers 23, European Economy Group.
    13. Rainer Schweickert, 2002. "The integration of accession countries into EMU—Concerns about convergence," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 37(2), pages 85-90, March.
    14. Kurz, Sascha & Maaser, Nicola & Napel, Stefan, 2018. "Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 152-161.
    15. Rossi, Sergio, 2004. "The enlargement of the euro area: what lessons can be learned from EMU?," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(6), pages 947-970, January.
    16. Matthew Gould & Matthew D. Rablen, 2017. "Reform of the United Nations Security Council: equity and efficiency," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 145-168, October.
    17. Madeleine O. Hosli, 2008. "Council Decision Rules and European Union Constitutional Design," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(1), pages 076-096, March.
    18. Matthias Weber, 2014. "Choosing Voting Systems behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Two-Tier Voting Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-042/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    19. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2008. "The European Commission–Appointment, preferences, and institutional relations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 21-41, October.
    20. Rahhal Lahrach & Jérôme Le Tensorer & Vincent Merlin, 2005. "Who benefits from the US withdrawal of the Kyoto Protocol? An application of the MMEA method to measure power," Post-Print halshs-00010171, HAL.
    21. Fidrmuc, Jan & Ginsburgh, Victor & Weber, Shlomo, 2009. "Voting on the choice of core languages in the European Union," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 56-62, March.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:42:y:2004:i:3:p:497-521. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0021-9886 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.