The Evolution of Algorithmic Learning Rules : A Global Stability Result
This paper considers the dynamic evolution of algorithmic (recursive) learning rules in a normal form game. It is shown that the system - the population frequencies - is globally stable for any arbitrary N-player normal form game, if the evolutionary process is algorithmic and the "birth process" guarantees that an appropriate set of "smart" rules is present in the population.
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Web page: http://www.eui.eu/ECO/
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- Blume, Lawrence & Easley, David, 1992. "Evolution and market behavior," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 9-40, October.
- Megiddo, Nimrod, 1989. "On computable beliefs of rational machines," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 144-169, June.
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