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Unpacking the unknown: a method for identifying status quo distributions

Author

Listed:
  • Ryan J. Vander Wielen

    (Temple University)

  • Michael J. Vander Wielen

    (Operational Mathematics Research Institute)

Abstract

Assumptions and implications regarding status quo locations are a common feature of theories of legislative politics. Yet challenges with measuring status quo locations have frustrated scholars for decades. This article introduces a method for measuring status quo distributions within individual, majority-rule legislatures. In particular, our identification strategy is grounded in the simple assumptions that bill sponsors are purposive, legislators vote for the policy alternative nearest their ideal point, and the chamber median is decisive. We derive analytically the probability that a legislator votes with the winning coalition as a function of her ideal point, the distribution of status quo locations, and the distribution of sponsor ideal points. We then introduce an optimization program that allows researchers to back out status quo distributions given the other, readily available inputs used in the analytical solution. We demonstrate its implementation by estimating the status quo distributions for US Houses of Representatives between 2005 and 2016.

Suggested Citation

  • Ryan J. Vander Wielen & Michael J. Vander Wielen, 2020. "Unpacking the unknown: a method for identifying status quo distributions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 49-72, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:182:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00668-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00668-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Status quo locations; Spatial modeling; Legislative organization; Optimization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

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