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Legislative organization and ideal-point bias

Author

Listed:
  • Keith Krehbiel

    (Stanford University, USA)

  • Zachary Peskowitz

    (The Ohio State University, USA)

Abstract

Four pure types of legislative organization are characterized as data-generating processes for commonly used measures of preferences or, in the spatial vernacular, ideal points. The types of legislative organization are differentiated by their partisan versus nonpartisan nature of agenda formation, and by whether the amendment process is open or closed. For each organization, roll call voting data are Monte Carlo generated and used as input for four different ideal-point measures: standard percent-correct interest-group ratings; linear factor analysis scores; W-NOMINATE ratings; and Markov chain Monte Carlo measures. Three questions motivate and are addressed in the analysis. Do estimated ideal points differ significantly across forms of legislative organization? Are some ideal-point estimates consistently more accurate than others? Are there patterns of substantively relevant, persistent bias in ideal-point estimates? The answers are all affirmative.

Suggested Citation

  • Keith Krehbiel & Zachary Peskowitz, 2015. "Legislative organization and ideal-point bias," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(4), pages 673-703, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:27:y:2015:i:4:p:673-703
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629814562290
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Ryan J. Vander Wielen & Michael J. Vander Wielen, 2020. "Unpacking the unknown: a method for identifying status quo distributions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 49-72, January.

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