IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

When Does Evolution Lead to Efficiency in Communication Games?

  • Karl H. Schlag

    ()

    (Wirtschaftstheoretische Abteilung III, UniversitÙt Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-26, D-53113 Bonn, Germany)

The evolutionary selection of outcomes (modelled using the replicator dynamics) in games with costless communication depends crucially on the structural assumptions made on the underlying population. (1) In conflicts between two interacting populations, common interest implies that the set of efficient outcomes is the unique evolutionarily stable set. Lack of common interest prevents sets with minimal stability properties to exist. (2) For conflicts within one population, inefficient evolutionarily stable strategies may exist independent of whether there is common interest or not. This is no longer true when there is a dominant strategy, in this case the efficiency result of the two population setup is recovered.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonsfb/bonsfb299.ps
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number 299.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Dec 1994
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:299
Contact details of provider: Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 6884
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Cabrales, Antonio, 2000. "Stochastic Replicator Dynamics," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(2), pages 451-81, May.
  2. K. Warneryd, 2010. "Evolutionary Stability in Unanimity Games with Cheap Talk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 543, David K. Levine.
  3. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
  4. K. Schlag, 2010. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Levine's Working Paper Archive 454, David K. Levine.
  5. Karl H. Schlag, 1994. "Evolution in Partnership Games,an Equivalence Result," Discussion Paper Serie B 298, University of Bonn, Germany.
  6. repec:att:wimass:9325 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 306-332, August.
  8. Sobel, Joel, 1993. "Evolutionary stability and efficiency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(2-3), pages 301-312.
  9. K. Schlag, 2010. "Cheap Talk and Evolutionary Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 541, David K. Levine.
  10. Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August.
  11. Akihiko Matsui, 1989. "Cheap Talk and Cooperation in the Society," Discussion Papers 848, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Karl Schlag, 1990. "Evolutionary Stability in Games with Equivalent Strategies," Discussion Papers 912, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Bhaskar, V., 1998. "Noisy Communication and the Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 110-131, September.
  14. Karl H. Schlag & Dieter Balkenborg, 2001. "Evolutionarily stable sets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 571-595.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:299. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (BGSE Office)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.