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Evolution in Partnership Games,an Equivalence Result

  • Karl H. Schlag

    ()

    (Wirtschaftstheoretische Abteilung III, UniversitÙt Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-26, D-53113 Bonn, Germany)

A partnership game is a two person game in which both players necessarily receive the same payoff. For symmetric partnership games it is shown that asymptotic stability with respect to the replicator dynamics, evolutionary stability (Maynard Smith and Price [1973], Thomas [1985]) and equilibrium evolutionary stability (Swinkels [1992]) are equivalent concepts. This equivalence result is also derived for asymmetric partnership games, both in the asymmetric contest (Selten[1980]) and in the two population setting (Balkenborg and Schlag [1994]). A side result shows for general games that equilibrium evolutionary stability is weaker than evolutionary stability.

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File URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonsfb/bonsfb298.ps
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Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number 298.

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Date of creation: Dec 1994
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:298
Contact details of provider: Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 6884
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de

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  1. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 306-332, August.
  2. A. Cabrales, 2010. "Stochastic Replicator Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 489, David K. Levine.
  3. Karl H. Schlag, 1995. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits," Discussion Paper Serie B 361, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Mar 1996.
  4. Blume, A. & Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1992. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Working Papers 92-17, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  5. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, June.
  6. K. Schlag, 2010. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Levine's Working Paper Archive 454, David K. Levine.
  7. van Damme, E.E.C., 1993. "Evolutionary game theory," Discussion Paper 1993-75, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  8. repec:att:wimass:9325 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. P. Taylor & L. Jonker, 2010. "Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 457, David K. Levine.
  10. Karl H. Schlag & Dieter Balkenborg, 2001. "Evolutionarily stable sets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 571-595.
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