Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy
Download full text from publisherTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Other versions of this item:
- Dixit, A. & Helpman, E., 1996. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy," Papers 179, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Dixit, Avinash K & Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1436, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Testa, Cecilia, 2003.
"Government corruption and legislative procedures: is one chamber better than two?,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
6642, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Cecilia Testa, 2003. "Government Corruption and Legislative Procedures: is One Chamber Better Than Two?," STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers 41, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Coate, Stephen, 2000.
"An Efficiency Approach to the Evaluation of Policy Changes,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(463), pages 437-455, April.
- Stephen Coate, 1999. "An Efficiency Approach to the Evaluation of Policy Changes," NBER Working Papers 7316, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rafael S. Espinosa Ramirez & Ana Torres Mata, 2004. "Corrupcion, inversion extranjera directa y reformas institucionales," EconoQuantum, Revista de Economia y Negocios, Universidad de Guadalajara, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Economico Administrativas, Departamento de Metodos Cuantitativos y Maestria en Economia., vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, Julio-Dic.
- Lahiri, Sajal & Raimondos-Moller, Paschalis, 1999. "Special interest politics and aid fungibility," Economics Discussion Papers 10001, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Marcel Vaillant, 1998. "Endogenous number of lobby groups in a specific factor trade model," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0198, Department of Economics - dECON.
- Schleich, Joachim & Orden, David, 1996. "Efficient choice among domestic and trade policies in the Grossman-Helpman Interest-Group Model," Bulletins 7458, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
More about this item
KeywordsINFORMATION; ECONOMIC MODELS;
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:11-96. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/fotauil.html .
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .