Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy
We develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with non-transferable utility, and prove that the principals'Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action. We apply this theory to construct a positive model of public finance, where organized special interests acan lobby the government for consumer and producer taxes or subsidies and targeted lump-sum taxes or transfers.
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|Date of creation:||1996|
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Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/research/foerder.asp
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