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Corrupcion, inversion extranjera directa y reformas institucionales

Author

Listed:
  • Rafael S. Espinosa Ramirez
  • Ana Torres Mata

    () (Universidad de Guadalajara)

Abstract

A pesar del solicitado beneficio discutido por el establecimiento de reformas institucionales en diversas economias, tal beneficio no es claro cuando hay algunas ineficiencias institucionales que lo dificultan. Desarrollamos un modelo de politica economica en el cual un gobierno en un pais trata de fijar el nivel institucional optimo tomando en cuenta el costo de esta politica en la inversion y en el bienestar del consumidor. Analizamos la misma decision de politica tomando en cuenta una contribucion politica hecha por un grupo de presion corrupto para beneficiarse a si mismos de un nivel institucional mas bajo. Nuestros resultados sugieren que el nivel institucional optimo dependera del grado de eficiencia de las estructuras legales contra las ilegales, del nivel de corrupcion y del tamano del mercado del bien producido.

Suggested Citation

  • Rafael S. Espinosa Ramirez & Ana Torres Mata, 2004. "Corrupcion, inversion extranjera directa y reformas institucionales," EconoQuantum, Revista de Economia y Negocios, Universidad de Guadalajara, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Economico Administrativas, Departamento de Metodos Cuantitativos y Maestria en Economia., vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, Julio-Dic.
  • Handle: RePEc:qua:journl:v:1:y:2004:i:1:p:17-39
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. Dexit, A. & Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1996. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy," Papers 11-96, Tel Aviv.
    3. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-985, December.
    4. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Common Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 923-942, July.
    5. Esty, Daniel C & Caves, Richard E, 1983. "Market Structure and Political Influence: New Data on Political Expenditures, Activity, and Success," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 21(1), pages 24-38, January.
    6. Bardhan, Pranab, 1989. "The new institutional economics and development theory: A brief critical assessment," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 17(9), pages 1389-1395, September.
    7. Rama, Martin & Tabellim, Guido, 1998. "Lobbying by capital and labor over trade and labor market policies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(7), pages 1295-1316, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    reformas institucionales; corrupcion; inversion extranjera directa;

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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