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Active Labour Market Policy by a Profit-Maximizing Firm

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  • Ruud Gerards
  • Joan Muysken
  • Riccardo Welters

Abstract

This article investigates the effectiveness of an employment programme exclusively run by a private sector firm in order to find out whether such a programme can be beneficial to both the participating individuals and the private firm. To answer these questions, we use a unique dataset on a private employment programme covering 23 years of operations and data on 1,000 participating unemployed individuals. Using conservative estimates, we show that a private employment programme is more effective in reintegrating the unemployed than public efforts, while providing tangible benefits to the firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Ruud Gerards & Joan Muysken & Riccardo Welters, 2014. "Active Labour Market Policy by a Profit-Maximizing Firm," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 52(1), pages 136-157, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:brjirl:v:52:y:2014:i:1:p:136-157
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-8543.2012.00915.x
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