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Dual Reduction and Elementary Games

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  • Myerson, Roger B.

Abstract

Consider the linear incentive constraints that define the correlated equilibria of a game. The duals of these constraints generate Markov chains on the players' strategy sets. The stationary distributions for these Markov chains can be interpreted as the strategies in a reduced game, which is called a dual reduction. Any equilibrium of a dual reduction is an equilibrium of the original game. We say that a game is elementary if all incentive constraints can be satisfied as strict inequalities in a correlated equilibrium. Any game can be reduced to an elementary game by iterative dual reduction.
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Suggested Citation

  • Myerson, Roger B., 1997. "Dual Reduction and Elementary Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 183-202, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:21:y:1997:i:1-2:p:183-202
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
    2. Dhillon, Amrita & Mertens, Jean Francois, 1996. "Perfect Correlated Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 279-302, February.
    3. Myerson, R B, 1986. "Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 15(3), pages 133-154.
    4. Nau, Robert F. & McCardle, Kevin F., 1990. "Coherent behavior in noncooperative games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 424-444, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yannick Viossat, 2004. "Replicator Dynamics and Correlated Equilibrium," Working Papers hal-00242953, HAL.
    2. Yannick Viossat, 2003. "Geometry, Correlated Equilibria and Zero-Sum Games," Working Papers hal-00242993, HAL.
    3. Ichiro Obara, "undated". "Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 399, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. Viossat, Yannick, 2006. "The Geometry of Nash Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria and a Generalization of Zero-Sum Games," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 641, Stockholm School of Economics.
    5. Viossat, Yannick, 2008. "Is having a unique equilibrium robust?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(11), pages 1152-1160, December.
    6. Du, Songzi, 2009. "Correlated Equilibrium via Hierarchies of Beliefs," MPRA Paper 16926, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5219 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Ichiro Obara & David Rahman, 2006. "Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000280, UCLA Department of Economics.
    9. Itai Arieli, 2008. "Towards a Characterization of Rational Expectations," Discussion Paper Series dp475, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    10. Yannick Viossat, 2003. "Properties of Dual Reduction," Working Papers hal-00242992, HAL.
    11. repec:dau:papers:123456789/3048 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2000. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1127-1150, September.
    13. AUMANN, Robert J. & DREZE, Jacques H., 2005. "When all is said and done, how should you play and what should you expect ?," CORE Discussion Papers 2005021, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    14. repec:dau:papers:123456789/882 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Itai Arieli, 2008. "Towards a Characterization of Rational," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002431, David K. Levine.
    16. Itai Arieli, 2008. "Towards a Characterization of Rational Expectations," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001891, UCLA Department of Economics.
    17. Yannick Viossat, 2003. "Elementary Games and Games Whose Correlated Equilibrium Polytope Has Full Dimension," Working Papers hal-00242991, HAL.
    18. Jiang, Albert Xin & Leyton-Brown, Kevin, 2015. "Polynomial-time computation of exact correlated equilibrium in compact games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 347-359.

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