Properties and applications of dual reduction
The dual reduction process, introduced by Myerson, allows a ﬁnite game to be reduced to a smaller-dimensional game such that any correlated equilibrium of the reduced game is an equilibrium of the original game. We study the properties and applications of this process. It is shown that generic two-player normal form games have a unique full dual reduction (a known reﬁnement of dual reduction) and all strat- egies that have probability zero in all correlated equilibria are eliminated in all full dual reductions. Among other applications, we give a linear programming proof of the fact that a unique correlated equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, and improve on a result due to Nau, Gomez-Canovas and Hansen on the geometry of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Publication status:||Published in Economic Theory, Springer Verlag, 2010, 44, pp.53--68. <10.1007/s00199-009-0477-6>|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00264031v2|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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