Elementary Games and Games Whose Correlated Equilibrium Polytope Has Full Dimension
A game is elementary if it has strict correlated equilibrium distributions with full support. A game is full if its correlated equilibrium polytope has full dimension. Any elementary game is full. We show that a full game is elementary if and only if all the correlated equilibrium incentive constraints are nonvacuous. Characterizations of full games are provided and examples are given. Finally, we give a method to build full, nonelementary games.
|Date of creation:||2003|
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