Conjugate duality of correlated equilibrium
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References listed on IDEAS
- Aumann, Robert J., 1974.
"Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
- AUMANN, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," CORE Discussion Papers RP 167, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
- Nau, Robert F. & McCardle, Kevin F., 1990. "Coherent behavior in noncooperative games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 424-444, April.
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- Joon Song, 2012. "Futures market: contractual arrangement to restrain moral hazard in teams," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(1), pages 163-189, September.
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KeywordsCorrelated equilibrium Lindahl equilibrium Conjugate duality;
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