Conjugate duality of correlated equilibrium
The play of a game is a public good because it is "consumed" by each of the players. We model the play as supplied by an organizer managing a team--the demanders of the public good whose actions are unobservable. Competition among organizers leads to a price-quantity description of efficient correlated equilibria, called incentive compatible Lindahl equilibria. Conjugate duality characterizations of the sets of (i) (non-incentive compatible) Lindahl equilibria for games in normal form, (ii) correlated equilibria, and (iii) incentive compatible Lindahl equilibria are compared.
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Levine's Working Paper Archive
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