On the geometry of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria
It is well known that the set of correlated equilibrium distributions of an n-player noncooperative game is a convex polytope that includes all the Nash equilibrium distributions. We demonstrate an elementary yet surprising result: the Nash equilibria all lie on the boundary of the polytope. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004
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Volume (Year): 32 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (08)
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