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Information leakage forces cooperation

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  • Matsui, Akihiko

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  • Matsui, Akihiko, 1989. "Information leakage forces cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 94-115, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:1:p:94-115
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
    2. James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
    3. David G. Pearce, 1987. "Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria: Collective Rationality and Intertemporal Cooperation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 855, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. Abreu, Dilip, 1986. "Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 191-225, June.
    5. Kaneko, Mamoru, 1987. "The conventionally stable sets in noncooperative games with limited observations I: Definitions and introductory arguments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 93-128, April.
    6. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August.
    7. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
    8. Kalai, Ehud, 1981. "Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 375-379, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
    2. Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J., 2004. "Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 355-384, August.
    3. Solan, Eilon & Yariv, Leeat, 2004. "Games with espionage," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 172-199, April.
    4. D. Thorleuchter & D. Van Den Poel, 2012. "Protecting Research and Technology from Espionage," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 12/824, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    5. Robson~ Arthur J., 1994. "An Informationally Robust Equilibrium for Two-Person Nonzero-Sum Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 233-245, September.
    6. Oliver Enrique Pardo Reinoso, 2015. "A Note on The Evolution of Preferences," ICESI ECONOMICS WORKING PAPERS 014568, UNIVERSIDAD ICESI.
    7. S. Ho, 2008. "Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 93(1), pages 31-58, February.
    8. A. Matsui, 2010. "Cheap-Talk and Cooperation in a Society," Levine's Working Paper Archive 536, David K. Levine.
    9. Cho, In-Koo & Matsui, Akihiko, 1995. "Induction and the Ramsey policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(5-7), pages 1113-1140.
    10. Barrachina, Alex & Tauman, Yair & Urbano, Amparo, 2014. "Entry and espionage with noisy signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 127-146.

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