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Induction and the Ramsey policy

  • Cho, In-Koo
  • Matsui, Akihiko

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V85-3YB56JR-R/2/9f98e9edc5d364c6201330a1b2fdc255
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.

Volume (Year): 19 (1995)
Issue (Month): 5-7 ()
Pages: 1113-1140

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Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:19:y:1995:i:5-7:p:1113-1140
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jedc

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  1. Akihiko Matsui, 1988. "Information Leakage Forces Cooperation," Discussion Papers 786, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1987. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player," Working papers 461, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  3. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
  4. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1986. "Adaptive Behavior and Economic Theory," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S401-26, October.
  5. V.V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1989. "Sustainable plans," Staff Report 122, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  6. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  7. Marcet, Albert & Sargent, Thomas J., 1989. "Convergence of least squares learning mechanisms in self-referential linear stochastic models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 337-368, August.
  8. V.V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1989. "Sustainable plans and mutual default," Staff Report 124, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  9. Kalai, Ehud & Samet, Dov & Stanford, William, 1988. "A Note on Reactive Equilibria in the Discounted Prisoner's Dilemma and Associated Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 177-86.
  10. Stokey, Nancy L., 1991. "Credible public policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 627-656, October.
  11. Abreu, Dilip & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1259-81, November.
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