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Inflation Targeting, Announcements, and Imperfect Credibility

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  • Diana N. Weymark

    (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)

Abstract

In virtually all theoretical studies of inflation targeting, the announced inflation target is treated as being fully credible. However, inflation targeting policies have typically been implemented after protracted periods of poor inflation performance when the policy authority's credibility is quite low. Because credibility imperfections may have a significant impact on inflation expectations and therefore on the monetary transmission mechanism, policies that are optimal under full credibility may not yield the best outcomes under imperfect credibility. In this article I use a simple dynamic model to study the implications that credibility imperfections have for the formulation of optimal inflation targeting policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Diana N. Weymark, 2001. "Inflation Targeting, Announcements, and Imperfect Credibility," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0124, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Apr 2002.
    • Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0124
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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu01-w24R.pdf
    File Function: Revised version, 2002
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Diana N. Weymark, 2000. "Using Taylor Rules as Efficiency Benchmarks," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0043, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Sep 2001.
    2. Stephen G. Cecchetti & Michael Ehrmann, 2002. "Does Inflation Targeting Increase Output Volatility?: An International Comparison of Policymakers' Preferences and Outcomes," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Norman Loayza & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series (ed.),Monetary Policy: Rules and Transmission Mechanisms, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 9, pages 247-274, Central Bank of Chile.
    3. Soderlind, Paul & Svensson, Lars, 1997. "New techniques to extract market expectations from financial instruments," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 383-429, October.
    4. McCallum, Bennett T, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central-Bank Independence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 207-211, May.
    5. Cho, In-Koo & Matsui, Akihiko, 1995. "Induction and the Ramsey policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(5-7), pages 1113-1140.
    6. Ireland, Peter N., 1999. "Does the time-consistency problem explain the behavior of inflation in the United States?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 279-291, October.
    7. Frederic S. Mishkin & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001. "One decade of inflation targeting in the world : What do we know and what do we need to know?," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 101, Central Bank of Chile.
    8. Bean, Charles, 1998. "The New UK Monetary Arrangements: A View from the Literature," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(451), pages 1795-1809, November.
    9. John B. Taylor, 1999. "Monetary Policy Rules," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number tayl99-1, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ravenna, Federico, 2005. "The European Monetary Union as a commitment device for new EU member states," Working Paper Series 516, European Central Bank.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Inflation targeting; credibility; announcements; inflation bias;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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