IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Inflation Targeting, Announcements, and Imperfect Credibility

  • Diana N. Weymark

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)

In virtually all theoretical studies of inflation targeting, the announced inflation target is treated as being fully credible. However, inflation targeting policies have typically been implemented after protracted periods of poor inflation performance when the policy authority's credibility is quite low. Because credibility imperfections may have a significant impact on inflation expectations and therefore on the monetary transmission mechanism, policies that are optimal under full credibility may not yield the best outcomes under imperfect credibility. In this article I use a simple dynamic model to study the implications that credibility imperfections have for the formulation of optimal inflation targeting policies.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu01-w24R.pdf
File Function: Revised version, 2002
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Vanderbilt University Department of Economics in its series Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers with number 0124.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Oct 2001
Date of revision: Apr 2002
Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0124
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/wparchive/index.html

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J., 1998. "Uncovering Financial Markets Beliefs About Inflation Targets," Cahiers de recherche 9803, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  2. Chan Huh, 1996. "Some evidence on the efficacy of the UK inflation targeting regime: an out-of-sample forecast approach," International Finance Discussion Papers 565, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  3. Svensson, Lars E. O., 2000. "Open-economy inflation targeting," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 155-183, February.
  4. Söderlind, Paul & Svensson, Lars E.O., 1997. "New Techniques to Extract Market Expectations from Financial Instruments," Seminar Papers 621, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  5. Glenn D. Rudebusch & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1998. "Policy rules for inflation targeting," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 98-03, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  6. Frederic S. Mishkin & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001. "One Decade of Inflation Targeting in the World: What Do We Know and What Do We Need to Know?," NBER Working Papers 8397, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Svensson, Lars E O, 1994. "The Simplest Test of Inflation Target Credibility," CEPR Discussion Papers 940, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Ireland, Peter N., 1999. "Does the time-consistency problem explain the behavior of inflation in the United States?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 279-291, October.
  9. Stephen G. Cecchetti & Michael Ehrmann, 2002. "Does Inflation Targeting Increase Output Volatility?: An International Comparison of Policymakers' Preferences and Outcomes," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Norman Loayza & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series (ed.), Monetary Policy: Rules and Transmission Mechanisms, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 9, pages 247-274 Central Bank of Chile.
  10. Frederic S. Mishkin & Adam S. Posen, 1998. "Inflation Targeting: Lessons from Four Countries," NBER Working Papers 6126, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Bennett T. McCallum, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 38, pages 195-225.
  13. Stanley Fischer, 1986. "Contracts, Credibility, and Disinflation," NBER Working Papers 1339, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Bean, Charles, 1998. "The New UK Monetary Arrangements: A View from the Literature," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(451), pages 1795-1809, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0124. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.