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La Nueva Síntesis Keynesiana: Análisis e Implicancias de Política Monetaria

  • Francisco Rosende

    ()

    (Instituto de Economía)

During the last decade, a new consensus has emerged among economists with respect to the way in which monetary policy should be conducted. According to this view, monetary policy should be focused in order to achieve a given inflation target. However, the

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Article provided by Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. in its journal Cuadernos de Economía-Latin American Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 39 (2002)
Issue (Month): 117 ()
Pages: 203-233

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Handle: RePEc:ioe:cuadec:v:39:y:2002:i:117:p:203-233
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  1. Adam S. Posen, 1995. "Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 253-274 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  3. Calvo, Guillermo A., 1983. "Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 383-398, September.
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  6. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1996. "Nobel Lecture: Monetary Neutrality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(4), pages 661-82, August.
  7. William Poole, 1970. "Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a simple stochastic macro model," Staff Studies 57, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  8. McCallum, Bennett T & Nelson, Edward, 1999. "An Optimizing IS-LM Specification for Monetary Policy and Business Cycle Analysis," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 31(3), pages 296-316, August.
  9. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2000. "International Experiences with Different Monetary Policy Regimes," NBER Working Papers 7044, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  11. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1980. "Two Illustrations of the Quantity Theory of Money," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(5), pages 1005-14, December.
  12. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 353-98, September.
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  15. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
  16. John M. Roberts, 2001. "How well does the New Keynesian sticky-price model fit the data?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2001-13, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  17. Benjamin M. Friedman & Kenneth N. Kuttner, 1996. "A Price Target for U.S. Monetary Policy? Lessons from the Experience with Money Growth Targets," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 27(1), pages 77-146.
  18. Goodhart, Charles A E, 1994. "What Should Central Banks Do? What Should Be Their Macroeconomic Objectives and Operations?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(427), pages 1424-36, November.
  19. Juan Pablo Medina & Rodrigo Valdés, 2000. "Optimal Monetary Policy Rules when the Current Account Matters," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 77, Central Bank of Chile.
  20. Fuhrer, Jeffrey C, 1997. "The (Un)Importance of Forward-Looking Behavior in Price Specifications," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(3), pages 338-50, August.
  21. Bennett T. McCallum, 1997. "Issues in the Design of Monetary Policy Rules," NBER Working Papers 6016, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Frederic S. Mishkin & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001. "One Decade of Inflation Targeting in the World: What Do We Know and What Do We Need to Know?," NBER Working Papers 8397, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1973. "Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 326-34, June.
  24. Frey, Bruno S. & Schneider, Friedrich, 1981. "Central bank behavior : A positive empirical analysis," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 291-315.
  25. Fernando Alvarez & Robert E. Lucas & Warren E. Weber, 2001. "Interest Rates and Inflation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 219-225, May.
  26. Ben S. Bernanke & Frederic S. Mishkin, 1997. "Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 97-116, Spring.
  27. Norman Loayza & Raimundo Soto, 2001. "Ten Years of Inflation Targeting: Design, Performance, Challenges," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 131, Central Bank of Chile.
  28. Bennett T. McCallum, 2001. "Should Monetary Policy Respond Strongly to Output Gaps?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 258-262, May.
  29. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
  30. Schmidt-Hebbel, Klaus & Tapia, Matias, 2002. "Inflation targeting in Chile," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 125-146, August.
  31. Norman Loayza & Raimundo Soto, 2002. "Inflation Targeting: An Overview," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Norman Loayza & Raimundo Soto & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series Editor) (ed.), Inflation Targeting: Desing, Performance, Challenges, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 1, pages 001-022 Central Bank of Chile.
  32. Michael Woodford, 2001. "The Taylor Rule and Optimal Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 232-237, May.
  33. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
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