Optimal MOnetary Policy Rules when the Current Account Matters
In: Monetary Policy: Rules and Transmission Mechanisms
This paper explores the implications for optimal monetary policy rules of including a target for the current account (CA) among central bank (CB) objectives. Using a simple but realistic macroeconomic model of the Chilean economy and standard dynamic programming with forward looking variables, the paper finds optimal rules under alternative specifications of a CB quadratic loss-function. The results show that optimal policy reactions change substantially when there is an objective for the CA (besides inflation). Furthermore, once the CA enters the CB objective function, the relative importance of output vis-à-vis inflation variability is less crucial in determining optimal policy rules. Using a simple 2-equation model, the paper then investigates the implications for monetary policy of having an asymmetric objective with respect to the CA. Specifically, it considers the case in which negative deviations from target are considered to be relatively more costly. The results indicate that, in this non-quadratic set-up, monetary policy is clearly more aggressive against positive inflation shocks than in the symmetric case.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|This chapter was published in: Norman Loayza & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series Editor) (ed.) Monetary Policy: Rules and Transmission Mechanisms, , chapter 4, pages 047-064, 2002.|
|This item is provided by Central Bank of Chile in its series Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series with number v04c04pp065-094.|
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Juan Pablo Medina & Rodrigo O. Valdés, 2002.
"Optimal Monetary Policy Rules under Inflation Range Targeting,"
Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series,
in: Norman Loayza & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series (ed.), Monetary Policy: Rules and Transmission Mechanisms, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 5, pages 095-116
Central Bank of Chile.
- Juan Pablo Medina & Rodrigo Valdés, 2000. "Optimal Monetary Policy Rules Under Inflation Range Targeting," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 61, Central Bank of Chile.
- Medina, J.P. & Valdes, R., 2000. "Optimal Monetary Policy Rules Under Inflation Range Targeting," Papers 61, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
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