Optimal Monetary Policy Rules Under Inflation Range Targeting
We calculate and compare optimal monetary policy (MP) rules for a simple economy under alternative central bank objective (loss) functions. We compare both soft- and hard-edges range (zone) targeting as well as asymmetric loss-functions to a quadratic loss case. The latter represents the standard loss-function for point inflation targeting. The results show that MP aggressiveness under range targeting critically depends on how hard are the edges of this range. If a range is thought of as a thick point objective, MP is always active (there are no inaction zones), although it is less aggressive against inflation and output shocks if range edges are sufficiently soft (vis-à-vis a point target). Harder edges makes MP more aggressive even when the economy is close to the central part of the range. Finally, an asymmetric loss-function for inflation that penalizes positive deviations relatively more generates a bias against output.
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