Entry and espionage with noisy signals
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Alex Barrachina, 2016. "Entry under an information-gathering monopoly," Working Papers 2016/09, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
- Alex Barrachina & Yair Tauman & Amparo Urbano Salvador, 2014. "Entry with Two Correlated Signals," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0714, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
- Po-Lu Chen, 2016. "Cross-Country Economic Espionage and Investment in Research and Development," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 8(4), pages 146-155, April.
More about this item
KeywordsEspionage; Entry; Asymmetric information; Signal-Jamming.;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-03-16 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2013-03-16 (Contract Theory & Applications)
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