Oligopolistic Entry Deterrence under Incomplete Information
Recent work has investigated the effects of asymmetric information between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant. This study extends the analysis to allow the initial market structure to be a noncooperative oligopoly. We show that there is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which the incumbent firms, although unable to collude, strategically deter entry that would have occurred under complete information. In contrast to the past limit-pricing literature, it is a high price that deters entry as it signals to the potential entrant that this is a high-cost industry. Extending the model to allow for multiple potential entrants, we find that increasing the degree of potential competition raises the preentry price and reduces the likelihood of entry.
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Volume (Year): 18 (1987)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
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