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Industrial cyberespionage in research and development races

Author

Listed:
  • Stupak, O.

Abstract

This paper examines a dynamic R&D race in which competitors can conduct cyberespionage against each other. We develop a framework that analyses the influence of cyberespionage on innovative incentives, companies' payoffs and the quality of the end product. We demonstrate that industrial espionage has an ambiguous influence on the overall investments exerted in the race and companies' expected payoffs and might even be beneficial for the quality of innovative end-products under certain circumstances.

Suggested Citation

  • Stupak, O., 2023. "Industrial cyberespionage in research and development races," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2337, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:2337
    Note: os446
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    8. C. Jill Stowe & Scott M. Gilpatric, 2010. "Cheating and Enforcement in Asymmetric Rank-Order Tournaments," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 1-14, July.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L53 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Enterprise Policy
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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