Strategic models of entry deterrence
In: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
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Cited by:
- JIMENEZ Edward, 2002. "Unified Game Theory," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002 25, Society for Computational Economics.
- Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 2007. "Productive Efficiency and Contestable Markets," Working Papers hal-00243066, HAL.
- James G. Mulligan, 2006. "Endogenously determined Quality and Price In a Two-Sector Competitive Service Market With an Application to Down-Hill Skiing," Working Papers 06-01, University of Delaware, Department of Economics.
- Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 2004.
"Rent Dissipation in Repeated Entry Games: Some New Results,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1186, CESifo Group Munich.
- Jean Pierre Ponssard, 2004. "Rent dissipation in repeated entry games: some new results," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000082, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Melkonyan, Tigran A., 2006. "Value of reputation in the chain-store game with multiple incumbents," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 425-448, March.
- Leemore S. Dafny, 2003. "Entry Deterrence in Hospital Procedure Markets: A Simple Model of Learning-By-Doing," NBER Working Papers 9871, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Xiao, Mo & Orazem, Peter F., 2011.
"Does the fourth entrant make any difference?: Entry and competition in the early U.S. broadband market,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 547-561, September.
- Xiao, Mo & Orazem, Peter, 2010. "Does the Fourth Entrant Make Any Difference? Entry and Competition in the Early U.S. Broadband Market," Staff General Research Papers Archive 32147, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Gromb, Denis & Ponssard, Jean-Pierre & Sevy, David, 1997. "Selection in Dynamic Entry Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 62-84, October.
- Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2001.
"Quitting Games,"
Mathematics of Operations Research,
INFORMS, vol. 26(2), pages 265-285, May.
- Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 1998. "Quitting Games," Discussion Papers 1227, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan, 2001. "Quitting Games," Post-Print hal-00465043, HAL.
- Lahmandi-Ayed, Rim & Ponssard, Jean-Pierre & Sevy, David, 1996. "Efficiency of dynamic quantity competition: A remark on Markovian equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 213-221, February.
- Gagen, Michael & Nemoto, Kae, 2006. "Variational optimization of probability measure spaces resolves the chain store paradox," MPRA Paper 4778, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Steinmetz, Sebastien, 1998. "Spatial preemption with finitely lived equipments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 253-270, March.
- Argenton, Cédric & Willems, Bert, 2015.
"Exclusion through speculation,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 1-9.
- Argenton, C. & Willems, Bert, 2010. "Exclusion Through Speculation," Discussion Paper 2010-83, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Cédric Argenton & Bert Willems, 2011. "Exclusion through speculation," RSCAS Working Papers 2011/63, European University Institute.
- Karaer, Özgen & Erhun, Feryal, 2015. "Quality and entry deterrence," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 240(1), pages 292-303.
- Nicola Giocoli, 2014.
"Games judges don't play: predatory pricing and strategic reasoning in US antitrust,"
Supreme Court Economic Review,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 271-330.
- Giocoli, Nicola, 2010. "Games judges don't play: predatory pricing and strategic reasoning in US antitrust," MPRA Paper 33810, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Arping, Stefan & Diaw, Khaled M., 2008. "Sunk costs, entry deterrence, and financial constraints," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 490-501, March.
- Barrachina, Alex & Tauman, Yair & Urbano, Amparo, 2014.
"Entry and espionage with noisy signals,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 127-146.
- Alex Barrachina & Yair Tauman & Amparo Urbano Salvador, 2013. "Entry and espionage with noisy signals," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0113, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
- Xiao, Mo & Orazem, Peter, 2006. "Do Entry Conditions Vary over Time? Entry and Competition in the Broadband Market: 1999-2003," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12500, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Dakshina De Silva & Thomas Jeitschko & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2009. "Entry and Bidding in Common and Private Value Auctions with an Unknown Number of Rivals," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 35(1), pages 73-93, September.
- Luis Eduardo Sandoval, 2008. "La regulación de los cargos de interconexión en telefonía fija para Colombia y sus perspectivas con el tratado de libre comercio," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO - ESCUELA DE ECONOMÍA 004683, UN - RCE - CID.
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- C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
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