Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma
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- Wiseman, Thomas & Yilankaya, Okan, 2001. "Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 216-242, October.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Mary L. Rigdon & Kevin A. McCabe & Vernon L. Smith, 2007.
"Sustaining Cooperation in Trust Games,"
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- Kevin McCabe & Mary Rigdon & Vernon Smith, 2004. "Sustaining Cooperation in trust Games," Experimental 0403005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Heller, Yuval & Mohlin, Erik, 2019.
"Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 223-247.
- Heller, Yuval & Mohlin, Erik, 2014. "Coevolution of Deception and Preferences: Darwin and Nash Meet Machiavelli," MPRA Paper 58255, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Philippe Grégoire & Arthur Robson, 2003. "Imitation, Group Selection and Cooperation," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(03), pages 229-247.
- Man, Priscilla T.Y., 2012. "Efficiency and stochastic stability in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 272-284.
More about this item
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CDM-1999-05-10 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-1999-05-10 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IND-1999-05-10 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-1999-05-10 (Microeconomics)
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