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Imitation, Group Selection and Cooperation

Author

Listed:
  • Philippe Grégoire

    () (Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, N6A 5C2, Canada)

  • Arthur Robson

    () (Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, N6A 5C2, Canada)

Abstract

A prior signalling stage is added to the Prisoner's Dilemma and the overall population involved is divided into a number of subpopulations. Evolution involves both local and global imitation — so that the process is formally one of "group selection". A subpopulation that is not signalling and defecting against one and all can be invaded by two "secret handshake" mutants. A subpopulation that is composed entirely of the secret handshake strategy can be invaded by a single "sucker punch" mutant. Nevertheless, if there are at least three subpopulations, the population cooperates always, in the limit as the mutation rate tends to zero.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Grégoire & Arthur Robson, 2003. "Imitation, Group Selection and Cooperation," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(03), pages 229-247.
  • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:05:y:2003:i:03:n:s0219198903001033
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198903001033
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wiseman, Thomas & Yilankaya, Okan, 2001. "Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 216-242, October.
    2. Hausken, Kjell, 1995. "The dynamics of within-group and between-group interaction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(7), pages 655-687.
    3. Hausken, Kjell, 2000. "Cooperation and between-group competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 417-425, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Prisoner's Dilemma; secret handshake; imitation; cooperation; group selection; evolution; best-reply dynamics;

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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