IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v125y2005i3p271-303.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Interest group size dynamics and policymaking

Author

Listed:
  • Vjollca Sadiraj
  • Jan Tuinstra
  • Frans Winden

Abstract

We present a dynamic model of endogenous interest group sizes and policymaking. The model integrates ‘top-down' (policy) and `bottom-up' (individual and social-structural) influences on the development of interest groups. Comparative statics results show that the standard assumption of fixed-sized interest groups can be misleading. Furthermore, dynamic analysis of the model demonstrates that reliance on equilibrium results can also be misleading since equilibria may be unstable. Complicated dynamics may then emerge naturally, leading to erratic time patterns for policy and interest group sizes. Our model can endogenously generate the types of spurts and declines in organizational density reported in empirical studies. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans Winden, 2005. "Interest group size dynamics and policymaking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 271-303, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:125:y:2005:i:3:p:271-303
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-4599-5
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-005-4599-5
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11127-005-4599-5?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Schmeidler & Itzhak Gilboa, 1994. "Reaction to Price Changes and Aspiration Level Adjustments," Working Papers 023, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.
    2. de Vilder, Robin, 1996. "Complicated Endogenous Business Cycles under Gross Substitutability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 416-442, November.
    3. Stanley L. Winer & Hirofumi Shibata (ed.), 2002. "Political Economy and Public Finance," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2805.
    4. Radcliff, Benjamin, 1992. "The Welfare State, Turnout, and the Economy: A Comparative Analysis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(2), pages 444-454, June.
    5. Freeman, Richard B, 1988. "Contraction and Expansion: The Divergence of Private Sector and Public Sector Unionism in the United States," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 63-88, Spring.
    6. Lijphart, Arend, 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1996," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 91(1), pages 1-14, March.
    7. Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1985. "On Endogenous Competitive Business Cycles," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 995-1045, September.
    8. Frans van Winden, 2002. "Experimental investigation of collective action," Chapters, in: Stanley L. Winer & Hirofumi Shibata (ed.), Political Economy and Public Finance, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Tuinstra, Jan, 2000. "The emergence of political business cycles in a two-sector general equilibrium model," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 509-534, September.
    10. Hausken, Kjell, 2000. "Cooperation and between-group competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 417-425, July.
    11. Schram, Arthur & Sonnemans, Joep, 1996. "Voter Turnout as a Participation Game: An Experimental Investigation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(3), pages 385-406.
    12. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-769, August.
    13. Toke Skovsgaard Aidt, 2002. "Strategic Political Participation and Redistribution," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 19-40.
    14. Richard B. Freeman, 1998. "Spurts in Union Growth: Defining Moments and Social Processes," NBER Chapters, in: The Defining Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century, pages 265-296, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Mueller,Dennis C. (ed.), 1997. "Perspectives on Public Choice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521553773, September.
    16. Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 2001. "original papers : Reaction to price changes and aspiration level adjustments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 6(2), pages 215-223.
    17. Neumann, George R & Rissman, Ellen R, 1984. "Where Have All the Union Members Gone?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(2), pages 175-192, April.
    18. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    19. Bosman, Ronald & Hennig-Schmidt, Heike & vanWinden, Frans, 2002. "Exploring Group Behavior in a Power-to-Take Video Experiment," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 7/2002, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    20. Baron, David P., 1994. "Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(1), pages 33-47, March.
    21. Bischoff, Ivo, 2003. "Determinants of the Increase in the Number of Interest Groups in Western Democracies: Theoretical Considerations and Evidence from 21 OECD Countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 114(1-2), pages 197-218, January.
    22. Hausken, Kjell, 1995. "The dynamics of within-group and between-group interaction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(7), pages 655-687.
    23. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
    24. Rothenberg, Lawrence S., 1988. "Organizational Maintenance and the Retention Decision in Groups," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(4), pages 1129-1152, December.
    25. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 2000. "An Explanation of Anomalous Behavior in Binary-Choice Games: Entry, Voting, Public Goods, and the Volunteers' Dilemma," Virginia Economics Online Papers 328, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
    26. Cassing, James H & Hillman, Arye L, 1986. "Shifting Comparative Advantage and Senescent Industry Collapse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 516-523, June.
    27. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, September.
    28. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
    29. Hwan Baik, Kyung & Lee, Sanghack, 1997. "Collective rent seeking with endogenous group sizes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 121-130, February.
    30. Selten, Reinhard, 1998. "Features of experimentally observed bounded rationality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 413-436, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sadiraj, Vjollca & Tuinstra, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 2010. "Identification of voters with interest groups improves the electoral chances of the challenger," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 210-216, November.
    2. Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans van Winden, 2005. "On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-034/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    3. Tuinstra, Jan & Wegener, Michael & Westerhoff, Frank, 2013. "Positive welfare effects of trade barriers in a dynamic equilibrium model," BERG Working Paper Series 91, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
    4. Anne Maria Busch, 2015. "Drug Prices and Pressure Group Activities in the German Health Care Market: An Application of the Becker Model," Working Paper Series in Economics 338, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
    5. Tuinstra, Jan & Wegener, Michael & Westerhoff, Frank, 2014. "Positive welfare effects of trade barriers in a dynamic partial equilibrium model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 246-264.
    6. Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans Winden, 2006. "A computational electoral competition model with social clustering and endogenous interest groups as information brokers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 169-187, October.
    7. Anne Maria Busch, 2015. "Drug Prices, Rents, and Votes in the German Health Care Market: An Application of the Peltzman Model," Working Paper Series in Economics 339, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Walter Hettich & Stanley L. Winer, 2004. "Regulation and Taxation: Analyzing Policy Interdependence," Carleton Economic Papers 04-03, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    2. Walter Hettich & Stanley L. Winer, 2006. "Analyzing the Interdependence of Regulation and Taxation," Public Finance Review, , vol. 34(4), pages 355-380, July.
    3. Mazza, Isidoro & van Winden, Frans, 2008. "An endogenous policy model of hierarchical government," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 133-149, January.
    4. Nauro F. Campos & Francesco Giovannoni, 2008. "Lobbying, Corruption and Other Banes," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp930, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    5. Hausken, Kjell, 2000. "Migration and intergroup conflict," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 327-331, December.
    6. Kjell Hausken, 2005. "Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 59-93, April.
    7. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    8. Arthur J. H. C. Schram, 2008. "Experimental Public Choice," Springer Books, in: Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, chapter 32, pages 579-591, Springer.
    9. Hausken, Kjell, 2000. "Cooperation and between-group competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 417-425, July.
    10. Zara Sharif & Otto H. Swank, 2019. "Do More Powerful Interest Groups Have a Disproportionate Influence on Policy?," De Economist, Springer, vol. 167(2), pages 127-143, June.
    11. Francisco Rodríguez, 2004. "Inequality, Redistribution, And Rent‐Seeking," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 287-320, November.
    12. Barry T. Hirsch & Edward J. Schumacher, 2001. "Private Sector Union Density and the Wage Premium: Past, Present, and Future ," Journal of Labor Research, Transaction Publishers, vol. 22(3), pages 487-518, July.
    13. Sadiraj, V. & Tuinstra, J. & Winden, F. van, 2001. "A dynamic model of endogenous interest group sizes and policymaking," CeNDEF Working Papers 01-03, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
    14. Aleksandar Vasilev, 2013. "On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a Real-Business-Cycle framework," Working Papers 2013_20, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    15. Toke S. Aidt, 2016. "Rent seeking and the economics of corruption," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 142-157, June.
    16. Reuben E., 2002. "Interest groups and politics: The need to concentrate on group formation," Public Economics 0212001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Coates, Dennis & Heckelman, Jac C. & Wilson, Bonnie, 2010. "The political economy of investment: Sclerotic effects from interest groups," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 208-221, June.
    18. Fredriksson, Per G. & Svensson, Jakob, 2003. "Political instability, corruption and policy formation: the case of environmental policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1383-1405, August.
    19. Aidt, Toke S. & Hillman, Arye L., 2008. "Enduring rents," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 545-553, September.
    20. Aidt, Toke Skovsgaard, 2003. "Redistribution and deadweight cost: the role of political competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 205-226, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:125:y:2005:i:3:p:271-303. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.