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Strategic Political Participation and Redistribution

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  • Toke Skovsgaard Aidt

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to study formation of support and opposition to redistribution. We analyze a society with two groups of citizens and a government. The government distributes income from one group to the other in response to political pressure. The interaction between the groups is modeled as a two‐stage game. In stage 1, the groups decide if they want to be politically active. In stage 2, the active group or groups seek influence on the direction and size of the transfer. We demonstrate that supporters of redistribution are always politically active but that opposition is often absent. Moreover, when opposition is absent there is a strong tendency for underdissipation of the transfer, while political competition typically leads to overdissipation.

Suggested Citation

  • Toke Skovsgaard Aidt, 2002. "Strategic Political Participation and Redistribution," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 19-40.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:14:y:2002:i:1:p:19-40
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00098
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Groll & Anja Prummer, 2016. "Whom to Lobby? Targeting in Political Networks," Working Papers 808, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    2. Aidt, Toke Skovsgaard, 2003. "Redistribution and deadweight cost: the role of political competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 205-226, June.
    3. Rowthorn, Robert & Seabright, Paul, 2010. "Property Rights, Warfare and the Neolithic Transition," TSE Working Papers 10-207, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    4. Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans Winden, 2005. "Interest group size dynamics and policymaking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 271-303, December.
    5. Johannes Münster, 2007. "Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Comment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 329-335, March.
    6. Seabright, Paul, 2008. "Warfare and the Multiple Adoption of Agriculture After the Last Ice Age," IDEI Working Papers 522, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    7. Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2015. "Lobbying for and Against Subsidizing Green Energy," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 925-947, December.
    8. Bellani, Luna & Fabella, Vigile Marie & Scervini, Francesco, 2023. "Strategic compromise, policy bundling and interest group power: Theory and evidence on education policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    9. Münster, Johannes, 2005. "Lobbying contests with endogenous policy proposals [Lobby Wettkämpfe mit endogenen Politikvorschlägen]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2005-11, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    10. Toke S. Aidt & Uk Hwang, 2014. "To Ban or Not to Ban: Foreign Lobbying and Cross-National Externalities," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 47(1), pages 272-297, February.
    11. Aidt, Toke S. & Hillman, Arye L., 2008. "Enduring rents," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 545-553, September.
    12. Thomas Groll & Anja Prummer, 2016. "Whom to Lobby? Targeting in Political Networks," Working Papers 808, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    13. Lea Kosnik, 2010. "Balancing Environmental Protection and Energy Production in the Federal Hydropower Licensing Process," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 86(3).
    14. Münster, Johannes, 2005. "Lobbying contests with endogenous policy proposals," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 41, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

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