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A computational electoral competition model with social clustering and endogenous interest groups as information brokers

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  • Vjollca Sadiraj
  • Jan Tuinstra
  • Frans van Winden

Abstract

We extend the basic model of spatial competition in two directions. First, political parties and voters do not have complete information but behave adaptively. Political parties use polls to search for policy platforms that maximize the probability of winning an election and the voting decision of voters is influenced by social interaction. Second, we allow for the emergence of interest groups. These interest groups transmit information about voter preferences to the political parties, and they coordinate voting behavior. We use simulation methods to investigate the convergence properties of this model. We find that the introduction of social dynamics and interest groups increases the separation between parties platforms, prohibits convergence to the center of the distribution of voter preferences, and increases the size of the winning set.

Suggested Citation

  • Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans van Winden, 2004. "A computational electoral competition model with social clustering and endogenous interest groups as information brokers," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2006-19, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
  • Handle: RePEc:exc:wpaper:2006-19
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Sadiraj, V. & Tuinstra, J. & Winden, F. van, 2005. "On the size of the winning set in the presence of interest groups," CeNDEF Working Papers 05-08, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
    7. Kollman, Ken & Miller, John H. & Page, Scott E., 1992. "Adaptive Parties in Spatial Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(4), pages 929-937, December.
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    9. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics and Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753.
    10. Valentina Corradi & Antonella Ianni, "undated". ""Consensus and Co-Existence in an Interactive Process of Opinion Formation''," CARESS Working Papres 98-09, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
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    12. Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans Winden, 2005. "Interest group size dynamics and policymaking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 271-303, December.
    13. Coughlin, Peter J, 1990. "Majority Rule and Election Models," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 157-188.
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    Cited by:

    1. Reuben, Ernesto & Traxler, Christian & van Winden, Frans, 2015. "Advocacy and political convergence under preference uncertainty," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 16-36.
    2. Sadiraj, Vjollca & Tuinstra, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 2010. "Identification of voters with interest groups improves the electoral chances of the challenger," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 210-216, November.
    3. Sadiraj, V. & Tuinstra, J. & Winden, F. van, 2005. "On the size of the winning set in the presence of interest groups," CeNDEF Working Papers 05-08, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
    4. Michael Ensley, 2012. "Incumbent positioning, ideological heterogeneity and mobilization in U.S. House elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 43-61, April.
    5. Zacharias Maniadis, 2009. "Campaign contributions as a commitment device," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 301-315, June.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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