IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpga/9501001.html

Analyzing Social Network Structures in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal

Author

Listed:
  • Mark D. Smucker

    (Univ. of Wisc.-Madison, Dept. of Computer Sciences)

  • E. Ann Stanley

    (Iowa State Univ., Dept. of Mathematics)

  • Dan Ashlock

    (Iowa State Univ., Dept. of Mathematics)

Abstract

The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal (IPD/CR) is an extension of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with evolution that allows players to choose and to refuse their game partners. From individual behaviors, behavioral population structures emerge. In this report, we examine one particular IPD/CR environment and document the social network methods used to identify population behaviors found within this complex adaptive system. In contrast to the standard homogeneous population of nice cooperators, we have also found metastable populations of mixed strategies within this environment. In particular, the social networks of interesting populations and their evolution are examined.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark D. Smucker & E. Ann Stanley & Dan Ashlock, 1995. "Analyzing Social Network Structures in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal," Game Theory and Information 9501001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9501001
    Note: 37 pages, uuencoded UNIX compress'd Postscript for email users (1.1Mb when uncompress'd). Also available as pure Postscript via WWW here .
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/9501/9501001.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/9501/9501001.ps.gz
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
    2. John Creedy & Jeff Borland & Jürgen Eichberger, 1992. "Recent Developments In Game Theory," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 115, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Marimon, R. & McGraltan, E., 1993. "On Adaptative Learning in Strategic Games," Papers 190, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
    2. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2013. "Homo Moralis—Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2269-2302, November.
    3. Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2014. "Evolution leads to Kantian morality," TSE Working Papers 14-504, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jun 2015.
    4. Förster, Manuel & Riedel, Frank, 2016. "Distorted Voronoi languages," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 458, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    5. Jason McKenzie Alexander & Brian Skyrms & Sandy Zabell, 2012. "Inventing New Signals," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 129-145, March.
    6. Inderst, Roman, 2002. "Contractual Signaling in a Market Environment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 77-98, July.
    7. Vogt, Carsten, 2000. "The evolution of cooperation in Prisoners' Dilemma with an endogenous learning mutant," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 347-373, July.
    8. Adriani, Fabrizio & Sonderegger, Silvia, 2015. "Trust, trustworthiness and the consensus effect: An evolutionary approach," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 102-116.
    9. Paola Manzini & Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 2009. "On Smiles, Winks and Handshakes as Coordination Devices," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(537), pages 826-854, April.
    10. Bhaskar, V., 1998. "Noisy Communication and the Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 110-131, September.
    11. Arthur T. Denzau & Douglass C. North, 1994. "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 3-31, February.
    12. Vyrastekova, J., 2002. "Efficiency versus Risk Dominance in an Evolutionary Model with Cheap Talk," Other publications TiSEM 8af6c389-f8e1-429a-9841-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    13. Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2018. "Peer Monitoring, Ostracism and the Internalization of Social Norms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001449, David K. Levine.
    14. Banerjee, Abhijit & Weibull, Jorgen W., 2000. "Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap-Talk Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-24, July.
    15. Possajennikov, Alexandre, 2002. "Cooperative prisoners and aggressive chickens : evolution of strategies and preferences in 2x2 games," Papers 02-04, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    16. Ockenfels, Axel & Selten, Reinhard, 2000. "An Experiment on the Hypothesis of Involuntary Truth-Signalling in Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 90-116, October.
    17. van Damme, E.E.C., 1991. "Equilibrium selection in 2 x 2 games (Paper presented at the XV Simposio de Anàlisis Económico, Barcelona, 17-19 December, 1990)," Discussion Paper 1991-8, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    18. Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2018. "Interventions when Social Norms are Endogenous: A Critique," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001479, UCLA Department of Economics.
    19. Kolstad, Ivar, 2007. "The evolution of social norms: With managerial implications," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 58-72, February.
    20. David Levine & Balázs Szentes, 2006. "Can A Turing Player Identify Itself?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 1(1), pages 1-6.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9501001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: EconWPA The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask EconWPA to update the entry or send us the correct address (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.