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The evolution of awareness

Author

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  • Grant, Simon
  • Quiggin, John

Abstract

We consider an evolutionary approach to how awareness is determined in games where players are not necessarily aware of all possible strategies. We begin with the standard notion of evolutionarily stable equilibrium, in which potential players pursue a fixed strategy. This constitutes a minimal level of awareness, since players are not required to know anything about the game or to reason about their opponents. We then consider the introduction of players with greater awareness.

Suggested Citation

  • Grant, Simon & Quiggin, John, 2017. "The evolution of awareness," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 86-92.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:63:y:2017:i:c:p:86-92
    DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2017.01.010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Simon Grant & John Quiggin, 2013. "Inductive reasoning about unawareness," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(3), pages 717-755, November.
    2. Peter Duersch & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper, 2012. "Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 553-564, August.
    3. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2006. "Interactive unawareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 78-94, September.
    4. Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
    5. Leandro Rêgo & Joseph Halpern, 2012. "Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(1), pages 131-155, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Lanzani, Giacomo, 2023. "Which misspecifications persist?," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unawareness; Bounded rationality; Evolutionarily stable equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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