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Sequential Two-Player Games with Ambiguity

  • Eichberger, Jürgen

    ()

    (Sonderforschungsbereich 504)

  • Kelsey, David

    ()

    (Department of Economics, The University of Birmingham)

If players' beliefs are strictly non-additive, the Dempster-Shafer updating rule can be used to define beliefs off the equilibrium path. We define an equilibrium concept in sequential two-person games where players update their beliefs with the Dempster-Shafer updating rule. We show that in the limit as uncertainty tends to zero, our equilibrium approximates Bayesian Nash equilibrium by imposing context-dependent constraints on beliefs under uncertainty.

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File URL: http://www.sfb504.uni-mannheim.de/publications/dp03-27.pdf
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Paper provided by Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim in its series Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications with number 03-27.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 13 Oct 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:03-27
Note: Financial assistance from the ESRC senior research fellowship scheme, award no. H52427502595, the School of Social Science at the University of Birmingham, the Department of Economics at the University of Melbourne and The British Academy is gratefully acknowledged. For comments we would like to thank Simon Grant, Hans Haller, Youngse Kim, Bart Lipman, Frank Milne, Shasi Nandeibam, Hyun Shin, Peter Sinclair, Willy Spanjers, Martin Summer, Peter Wakker and participants in seminars at Queen
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  1. Camerer, Colin & Weber, Martin, 1992. "Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 325-70, October.
  2. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1987. "Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer," NBER Working Papers 2161, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Marinacci, Massimo, 2000. "Ambiguous Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 191-219, May.
  4. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
  5. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 1996. "Uncertainty Aversion and Preference for Randomisation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 31-43, October.
  6. Kin Chung Lo, 1995. "Extensive Form Games with Uncertainty Averse Players," Working Papers ecpap-95-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  7. Sarin, Rakesh K & Wakker, Peter, 1992. "A Simple Axiomatization of Nonadditive Expected Utility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1255-72, November.
  8. Nehring, Klaus, 1994. "On the Interpretation of Sarin and Wakker's "A Simple Axiomatization of Nonadditive Expected Utility."," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 935-38, July.
  9. Brandts, Jordi & Holt, Charles A, 1992. "An Experimental Test of Equilibrium Dominance in Signaling Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1350-65, December.
  10. Lo, Kin Chung, 1996. "Equilibrium in Beliefs under Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 443-484, November.
  11. Itzhak Gilboa & David Scheidler, 1993. "Updating Ambiguous Beliefs," Post-Print hal-00753150, HAL.
  12. Itzhak Gilboa, 1989. "Duality in Non-Additive Expected Utility Theory," Post-Print hal-00753238, HAL.
  13. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 2002. "Strategic Complements, Substitutes, and Ambiguity: The Implications for Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 436-466, October.
  14. Ryan, Matthew J., 2002. "Violations of Belief Persistence in Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 167-174, April.
  15. Dow James & Werlang Sergio Ribeiro Da Costa, 1994. "Nash Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty: Breaking Down Backward Induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 305-324, December.
  16. Eichberger, Jurgen & Kelsey, David, 2000. "Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 183-215, February.
  17. Eichberger, J. & Kelsey, D., 1996. "E-Capacities and the Ellsberg Paradox," Discussion Papers 96-13, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  18. Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-87, May.
  19. Banks, Jeffrey & Camerer, Colin & Porter, David., 1990. "An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games," Working Papers 740, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  20. Brandts, Jordi & Holt, Charles A, 1993. "Adjustment Patterns and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Signaling Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 22(3), pages 279-302.
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