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Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer

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  • Lucian Arye Bebchuk

Abstract

In many disputes, the expected value to the plaintiff from going to trial is negative, either because the chances of winning are small or because the litigation costs are large. While such a plaintiff would not go to trial, he might sue in the hope of extracting a settlement offer: the defendant might make such an offer if he is uncertain as to whether or not the expected value to the plaintiff of going to trial is negative. This paper seeks to identify the factors that determine: (i) whether a plaintiff who does not intend to go to trial will nonetheless succeed in extracting an offer; and (ii) how much will such a plaintiff succeed in extracting.

Suggested Citation

  • Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1987. "Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer," NBER Working Papers 2161, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2161
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. I.P.L. P'ng, 1983. "Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 539-550, Autumn.
    2. Rosenberg, D. & Shavell, S., 1985. "A model in which suits are brought for their nuisance value," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 3-13, June.
    3. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn.
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