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Thomas Wiseman

Personal Details

First Name:Thomas
Middle Name:
Last Name:Wiseman
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pwi274
https://sites.google.com/site/thomaswisemaneconomics/home
Terminal Degree:2001 Department of Economics; Northwestern University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of Texas-Austin

Austin, Texas (United States)
http://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/economics/

+1 (512) 471-3211
+1 (512) 471-3510
Austin, Texas 78712
RePEc:edi:deutxus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Thomas Wiseman, 2013. "Memory and the Limits of Money," Department of Economics Working Papers 130313, The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics.
  2. Thomas E. Wiseman, 2011. "A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Private Learning," 2011 Meeting Papers 181, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  3. Thomas Wiseman, 2006. "Reputation and Impermanent Types," 2006 Meeting Papers 650, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. Thomas Wiseman & R. Preston McAfee, 2005. "Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture," 2005 Meeting Papers 636, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  5. Li Gan & Roberton C. Williams III & Thomas Wiseman, 2004. "A Simple Model of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation," NBER Working Papers 10463, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Thomas Wiseman & Okan Yilankaya, 1999. "Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Discussion Papers 1248, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

Articles

  1. Sperisen, Benjamin & Wiseman, Thomas, 2020. "Too good to fire: Non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 491-511.
  2. Krainin, Colin & Thomas, Caroline & Wiseman, Thomas, 2020. "Rational Quagmires: Attrition, Learning, and War," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 15(3), pages 369-400, July.
  3. Dur, Umut Mert & Wiseman, Thomas, 2019. "School choice with neighbors," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 101-109.
  4. Wiseman, Thomas, 2018. "Competitive long-term health insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 144-150.
  5. Thomas Wiseman, 2017. "When Does Predation Dominate Collusion?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 555-584, March.
  6. Thomas Wiseman, 2015. "A Note on the Essentiality of Money under Limited Memory," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(4), pages 881-893, October.
  7. Peski, Marcin & Wiseman, Thomas, 2015. "A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
  8. Kenneth Hendricks & Alan Sorensen & Thomas Wiseman, 2012. "Observational Learning and Demand for Search Goods," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 1-31, February.
  9. Kenneth Hendricks & Ilke Onur & Thomas Wiseman, 2012. "Last-Minute Bidding in Sequential Auctions with Unobserved, Stochastic Entry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 40(1), pages 1-19, February.
  10. Wiseman, Thomas, 2012. "A partial folk theorem for games with private learning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
  11. Paal, Beatrix & Wiseman, Thomas, 2011. "Group insurance and lending with endogenous social collateral," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 30-40, January.
  12. Li Gan & Roberton C. Williams Iii & Thomas Wiseman, 2011. "A Simple Model Of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 49(3), pages 674-684, July.
  13. Geraghty, Thomas M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2011. "Conflict and compromise: Changes in U.S. strike outcomes, 1880 to 1945," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 519-537.
  14. Wiseman, Thomas, 2009. "Reputation and exogenous private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1352-1357, May.
  15. Thomas Wiseman, 2009. "Sequential Choice And Non-Bayesian Observational Learning," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 11(03), pages 285-300.
  16. Geraghty, Thomas M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Wage strikes in 1880s America: A test of the war of attrition model," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 303-326, September.
  17. Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Reputation and impermanent types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 190-210, January.
  18. R. Preston Mcafee & Thomas Wiseman, 2008. "Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(1), pages 317-331.
  19. Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Disagreement leads to complete learning: Sequential choice with continuous types," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 53-55, July.
  20. Thomas Wiseman, 2005. "A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 629-645, March.
  21. Mialon, Hugo M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2005. "The impact of gun laws: A model of crime and self-defense," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 170-175, August.
  22. Wiseman, Thomas & Yilankaya, Okan, 2001. "Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 216-242, October.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Wikipedia or ReplicationWiki mentions

(Only mentions on Wikipedia that link back to a page on a RePEc service)
  1. Kenneth Hendricks & Alan Sorensen & Thomas Wiseman, 2012. "Observational Learning and Demand for Search Goods," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 1-31, February.

    Mentioned in:

    1. Observational Learning and Demand for Search Goods (AEJ:MI 2012) in ReplicationWiki ()

Working papers

  1. Thomas E. Wiseman, 2011. "A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Private Learning," 2011 Meeting Papers 181, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. Tristan Tomala, 2013. "Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games," Post-Print hal-01026126, HAL.
    2. Sugaya, Takuo & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 0. "Common learning and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    3. Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations," CESifo Working Paper Series 4700, CESifo.
    4. Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Post-Print hal-00630299, HAL.
    5. Brangewitz, Sonja & Giraud, Gael, 2016. "Learning in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games with Collateral and Incomplete Information," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 456, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    6. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "We Can Cooperate Even When the Monitoring Structure Will Never Be Known," PIER Working Paper Archive 17-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Apr 2017.
    7. Françoise Forges, 2012. "Folk theorems for Bayesian (public good) games," Post-Print hal-02447604, HAL.
    8. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "Stochastic Games with Hidden States, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-019, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Jun 2015.
    9. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games," Scholarly Articles 9962008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    10. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2019. "Stochastic games with hidden states," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), September.
    11. Pathikrit Basu & Kalyan Chatterjee & Tetsuya Hoshino & Omer Tamuz, 2018. "Repeated Coordination with Private Learning," Papers 1809.00051, arXiv.org.
    12. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "Stochastic Games With Hidden States, Fourth Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-012, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 09 Nov 2017.
    13. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    14. Basu, Pathikrit & Chatterjee, Kalyan & Hoshino, Tetsuya & Tamuz, Omer, 2020. "Repeated coordination with private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    15. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2015. "Stochastic Games with Hidden States," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    16. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    17. Takuo Sugaya & Yuichi Yamamoto, 2019. "Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 19-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    18. Sonja Brangewitz & Gaël Giraud, 2012. "Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games with Default," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12062r, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, revised Oct 2013.

  2. Thomas Wiseman, 2006. "Reputation and Impermanent Types," 2006 Meeting Papers 650, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. Mehmet Ekmekci & Olivier Gossner & Andrea Wilson, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754608, HAL.
    2. Johannes Hörner & Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2010. "On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 58(4-part-2), pages 1107-1115, August.
    3. Liu, Qingmin & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2014. "Limited records and reputation bubbles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 2-29.
    4. Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2012. "Cycles of Distrust: An Economic Model," NBER Working Papers 18257, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Pierre Cardaliaguet & Catherine Rainer & Dinah Rosenberg & Nicolas Vieille, 2016. "Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information—The Limit Case," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 41(1), pages 49-71, February.
    6. Sperisen, Benjamin, 2018. "Bounded memory and incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 382-400.
    7. Benjamin Sperisen, 2018. "Bad Reputation Under Bounded And Fading Memory," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(1), pages 138-157, January.
    8. Sharma, Priyanka, 2017. "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 269-283.
    9. Schottmüller, Christoph, 2019. "Too good to be truthful: Why competent advisers are fired," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 333-360.
    10. Hakenes, Hendrik & Katolnik, Svetlana, 2017. "On the incentive effects of job rotation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 424-441.
    11. Mehmet Ekmekci, 2010. "Sustainable Reputations with Rating Systems," Discussion Papers 1505, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    12. Andrew Mell, 2015. "Fooling Some of the People Some of the Time: Reputation Management and Optimal Betrayal," Economics Series Working Papers 770, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    13. Alp Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2009. "Reputation in Long-Run Relationships," Discussion Papers 1507, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    14. Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan & Jérôme Renault, 2013. "Dynamic sender-receiver games," Post-Print hal-00804028, HAL.
    15. Monte, Daniel, 2013. "Bounded memory and permanent reputations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 345-354.
    16. Johannes Horner & Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2009. "On a Markov Game with One-Sided Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1737, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    17. Dilmé, Francesc, 2019. "Reputation building through costly adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 586-626.

  3. Thomas Wiseman & R. Preston McAfee, 2005. "Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture," 2005 Meeting Papers 636, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. Johannes Hörner & Larry Samuelson, 2011. "Managing Strategic Buyers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(3), pages 379-425.
    2. Xing Li & Megan MacGarvie & Petra Moser, 2015. "Dead Poet's Property - How Does Copyright Influence Price?," NBER Working Papers 21522, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Doval, Laura & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2019. "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," CEPR Discussion Papers 13967, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Xu, Frances Zhiyun, 2011. "Optimal best-price policy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 628-643, September.
    5. Wilner, Lionel, 2014. "Intertemporal price discrimination in infinite horizon," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 358-361.
    6. Montero, Juan Pablo, 2011. "A note on environmental policy and innovation when governments cannot commit," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(S1), pages 13-19.
    7. Seres, Gyula, 2019. "Uncertain Commitment Power in a Durable Good Monopoly," Discussion Paper 2019-006, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    8. Francesco Nava & Pasquale Schiraldi, 2019. "Differentiated Durable Goods Monopoly: A Robust Coase Conjecture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(5), pages 1930-1968, May.
    9. Richard F. Hartl & Peter M. Kort & Andrea Seidl, 2020. "Decisions on pricing, capacity investment, and introduction timing of new product generations in a durable-good monopoly," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 28(2), pages 497-519, June.
    10. Roman Inderst, 2008. "Dynamic Bilateral Bargaining under Private Information with a Sequence of Potential Buyers," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(1), pages 220-236, January.
    11. Ken Moon & Kostas Bimpikis & Haim Mendelson, 2018. "Randomized Markdowns and Online Monitoring," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(3), pages 1271-1290, March.
    12. Mak, Vincent & Rapoport, Amnon & Gisches, Eyran J., 2012. "Competitive dynamic pricing with alternating offers: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 250-264.
    13. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2019. "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," Papers 1904.07456, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2020.
    14. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David G. & Stacchetti, Ennio, 2015. "One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
    15. Ortner, Juan, 2017. "Durable goods monopoly with stochastic costs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.

  4. Li Gan & Roberton C. Williams III & Thomas Wiseman, 2004. "A Simple Model of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation," NBER Working Papers 10463, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Cited by:

    1. Jason Chan & Anindya Ghose & Robert Seamans, 2013. "The Internet and Hate Crime: Offline Spillovers from Online Access," Working Papers 13-02, NET Institute.
    2. Ehud Guttel & Barak Medina, 2007. "Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions," Discussion Paper Series dp472, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    3. Ehud Guttel & Barak Medina, 2007. "Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001799, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. Dharmapala Dhammika & Garoupa Nuno & McAdams Richard H., 2009. "Belief in a Just World, Blaming the Victim, and Hate Crime Statutes," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 311-345, May.
    5. Francesco Parisi & Jonathan Klick & Nuno Garoupa, 2006. "A Law and Economics Perspective on Terrorism," Working Papers 2006-09, FEDEA.

  5. Thomas Wiseman & Okan Yilankaya, 1999. "Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Discussion Papers 1248, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Kevin McCabe & Mary Rigdon & Vernon Smith, 2004. "Sustaining Cooperation in trust Games," Experimental 0403005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Heller, Yuval & Mohlin, Erik, 2019. "Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 223-247.
    3. Philippe Grégoire & Arthur Robson, 2003. "Imitation, Group Selection and Cooperation," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(03), pages 229-247.
    4. Man, Priscilla T.Y., 2012. "Efficiency and stochastic stability in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 272-284.

Articles

  1. Dur, Umut Mert & Wiseman, Thomas, 2019. "School choice with neighbors," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 101-109.

    Cited by:

    1. Jörgen Kratz, 2017. "Overlapping multiple object assignments," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(3), pages 723-753, March.
    2. Nadja Stroh-Maraun, 2020. "Pareto Efficiency in Weighted School Choice Problems," Working Papers Dissertations 64, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
    3. Fisher, James C.D., 2020. "Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: A topological approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 136-140.
    4. Itai Ashlagi & Peng Shi, 2014. "Improving Community Cohesion in School Choice via Correlated-Lottery Implementation," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 62(6), pages 1247-1264, December.

  2. Thomas Wiseman, 2017. "When Does Predation Dominate Collusion?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 555-584, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Argenton, Cédric, 2019. "Colluding on excluding," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 194-206.

  3. Thomas Wiseman, 2015. "A Note on the Essentiality of Money under Limited Memory," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(4), pages 881-893, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Gomis-Porqueras Pedro & Sun Ching-Jen, 2020. "Fiat Money as a Public Signal, Medium of Exchange, and Punishment," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 1-11, June.

  4. Peski, Marcin & Wiseman, Thomas, 2015. "A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.

    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Cardaliaguet & Catherine Rainer & Dinah Rosenberg & Nicolas Vieille, 2016. "Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information—The Limit Case," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 41(1), pages 49-71, February.
    2. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan, 2016. "Protocol Invariance and the Timing of Decisions in Dynamic Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 11447, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2013. "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1933R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2015.
    4. Dutta, Prajit K. & Siconolfi, Paolo, 2019. "Asynchronous games with transfers: Uniqueness and optimality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 46-75.

  5. Kenneth Hendricks & Alan Sorensen & Thomas Wiseman, 2012. "Observational Learning and Demand for Search Goods," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 1-31, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Helios Herrera & Johannes Horner, 2009. "Biased Social Learning," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1738, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Andrew T. Ching & Tülin Erdem & Michael P. Keane, 2017. "Empirical Models of Learning Dynamics: A Survey of Recent Developments," International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, in: Berend Wierenga & Ralf van der Lans (ed.), Handbook of Marketing Decision Models, edition 2, chapter 0, pages 223-257, Springer.
    3. Matthew Grennan & Ashley Swanson, 2016. "Transparency and Negotiated Prices: The Value of Information in Hospital-Supplier Bargaining," NBER Working Papers 22039, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Zachary Mahone & Filippo Rebessi, 2019. "Consumer Learning and Firm Dynamics," Department of Economics Working Papers 2019-08, McMaster University.
    5. Ken Hendricks & Alan Sorensen, 2009. "Information and the Skewness of Music Sales," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(2), pages 324-369, April.
    6. Jin-Hyuk Kim & Peter Newberry & Calvin Qiu, 2015. "An Empirical Analysis of a Crowdfunding Platform," Working Papers 15-12, NET Institute.
    7. Essling, Christian & Könen, Johannes & Peukert, Christian, 2017. "Competition for attention in the digital age: The case of single releases in the recorded music industry," Munich Reprints in Economics 49913, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    8. Song, Yangbo, 2016. "Social learning with endogenous observation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 324-333.
    9. Monzón, Ignacio & Rapp, Michael, 2014. "Observational learning with position uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 375-402.
    10. He, Qiao-Chu & Chen, Ying-Ju, 2018. "Dynamic pricing of electronic products with consumer reviews," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 123-134.
    11. Liangfei Qiu & Asoo Vakharia & Arunima Chhikara, 2019. "Multi-Dimensional Observational Learning in Social Networks: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 19-01, NET Institute.
    12. Babur De los Santos & Sergei Koulayev, 2012. "Optimizing Click-through in Online Rankings for Partially Anonymous Consumers," Working Papers 2012-04, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    13. Kaufman, Noah, 2014. "Overcoming the barriers to the market performance of green consumer goods," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 487-507.
    14. Jin Huang, 2017. "To Glance or to Peruse: Observational and Active Learning from Peer Consumers," Working Papers wp2017_1716, CEMFI.
    15. Jerker Denrell & Gaël Le Mens, 2017. "Information Sampling, Belief Synchronization, and Collective Illusions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(2), pages 528-547, February.
    16. Masatlioglu, Yusufcan & Nakajima, Daisuke, 2013. "Choice by iterative search," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.
    17. Daniel Garcia & Sandro Shelegia, 2018. "Consumer search with observational learning," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(1), pages 224-253, March.
    18. Ali, S. Nageeb, 2018. "Herding with costly information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 713-729.

  6. Kenneth Hendricks & Ilke Onur & Thomas Wiseman, 2012. "Last-Minute Bidding in Sequential Auctions with Unobserved, Stochastic Entry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 40(1), pages 1-19, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Dominic Coey & Bradley Larsen & Brennan Platt, 2016. "Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search," NBER Working Papers 22038, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Said, Maher, 2008. "Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization," MPRA Paper 11456, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Backus, Matthew R. & Podwol, Joseph Uri & Schneider, Henry S., 2014. "Search costs and equilibrium price dispersion in auction markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 173-192.
    4. Onur, Ilke & Velamuri, Malathi, 2014. "Competition, endogeneity and the winning bid: An empirical analysis of eBay auctions," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 68-74.

  7. Wiseman, Thomas, 2012. "A partial folk theorem for games with private learning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Paal, Beatrix & Wiseman, Thomas, 2011. "Group insurance and lending with endogenous social collateral," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 30-40, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Chowdhury, Shyamal & Chowdhury, Prabal Roy & Sengupta, Kunal, 2014. "Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 167-180.
    2. Janssens, Wendy & Kramer, Berber, 2016. "The social dilemma of microinsurance: Free-riding in a framed field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PB), pages 47-61.
    3. Ahlin, Christian & Jiang, Neville, 2008. "Can micro-credit bring development?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 1-21, April.
    4. Ernan Rustiadi & Ahmadriswan Nasution, 2017. "Can Social Capital Investment Reduce Poverty in Rural Indonesia?," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 7(2), pages 109-117.
    5. Liu, Zhengchi & Shang, Jennifer & Wu, Shin-yi & Chen, Pei-yu, 2020. "Social collateral, soft information and online peer-to-peer lending: A theoretical model," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 281(2), pages 428-438.
    6. Shoji, Masahiro & Aoyagi, Keitaro & Kasahara, Ryuji & Sawada, Yasuyuki & Ueyama, Mika, 2012. "Social Capital Formation and Credit Access: Evidence from Sri Lanka," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(12), pages 2522-2536.
    7. Tong Zhang & Huiting Liu & Pinghan Liang, 2020. "Social Trust Formation and Credit Accessibility—Evidence from Rural Households in China," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 12(2), pages 1-14, January.
    8. Shyamal Chowdhury & Prabal Roy Chowdhury & Kunal Sengupta, 2014. "Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance," Discussion Papers 14-07, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.

  9. Li Gan & Roberton C. Williams Iii & Thomas Wiseman, 2011. "A Simple Model Of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 49(3), pages 674-684, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  10. Geraghty, Thomas M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2011. "Conflict and compromise: Changes in U.S. strike outcomes, 1880 to 1945," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 519-537.

    Cited by:

    1. Stefan Oliver Houpt & Juan Carlos Rojo Cagigal, 2014. "Relative deprivation and labour conflict during Spain’s industrialization: the Bilbao estuary, 1914–1936," Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 8(3), pages 335-369, September.
    2. Enflo, Kerstin & Karlsson, Tobias, 2018. "From Conflict to Compromise: The importance of mediation in Swedish work stoppages 1907-1927," CEPR Discussion Papers 12586, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  11. Wiseman, Thomas, 2009. "Reputation and exogenous private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1352-1357, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Mehmet Ekmekci & Olivier Gossner & Andrea Wilson, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754608, HAL.
    2. Sharma, Priyanka, 2017. "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 269-283.
    3. Jesper Rudiger & Adrien Vigier, 2015. "Pundits and Quacks," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1997, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. Hu, Ju, 2014. "Reputation in the presence of noisy exogenous learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 64-73.
    5. Mehmet Ekmekci, 2010. "Sustainable Reputations with Rating Systems," Discussion Papers 1505, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. Ju Hu, 2013. "Reputation in the Presence of Noisy Exogenous Learning," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-009, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    7. Huang, Chong, 2017. "Defending against speculative attacks: The policy maker's reputation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 1-34.
    8. Chong Huang, 2011. "Defending Against Speculative Attacks: Reputation, Learning, and Coordination," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-039, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.

  12. Geraghty, Thomas M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Wage strikes in 1880s America: A test of the war of attrition model," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 303-326, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Stefan Oliver Houpt & Juan Carlos Rojo Cagigal, 2014. "Relative deprivation and labour conflict during Spain’s industrialization: the Bilbao estuary, 1914–1936," Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 8(3), pages 335-369, September.
    2. Kyung nok Chun & Zachary Schaller & Stergios Skaperdas, 2020. "Why Are There Strikes?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 929-956.
    3. Pantsios, Archontis L. & Polachek, Solomon, 2017. "How Asymmetrically Increasing Joint Strike Costs Need Not Lead to Fewer Strikes," IZA Discussion Papers 10723, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Geraghty, Thomas M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2011. "Conflict and compromise: Changes in U.S. strike outcomes, 1880 to 1945," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 519-537.
    5. Enflo, Kerstin & Karlsson, Tobias, 2018. "From Conflict to Compromise: The importance of mediation in Swedish work stoppages 1907-1927," CEPR Discussion Papers 12586, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  13. Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Reputation and impermanent types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 190-210, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  14. R. Preston Mcafee & Thomas Wiseman, 2008. "Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(1), pages 317-331.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  15. Thomas Wiseman, 2005. "A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 629-645, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Tristan Tomala, 2013. "Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games," Post-Print hal-01026126, HAL.
    2. Sugaya, Takuo & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 0. "Common learning and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    3. Sylvain Chassang, 2010. "Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 448-465, March.
    4. Brangewitz, Sonja & Giraud, Gael, 2016. "Learning in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games with Collateral and Incomplete Information," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 456, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    5. Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille , Nicolas, 2013. "Strategic Information Exchange," HEC Research Papers Series 1009, HEC Paris.
    6. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "We Can Cooperate Even When the Monitoring Structure Will Never Be Known," PIER Working Paper Archive 17-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Apr 2017.
    7. Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2006. "Common Learning," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1575R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2007.
    8. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "Stochastic Games with Hidden States, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-019, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Jun 2015.
    9. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "Stochastic Games with Hidden States, Fifth version," PIER Working Paper Archive 18-028, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 19 May 2018.
    10. Blume, Andreas & Franco, April Mitchell & Heidhues, Paul, 2011. "Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 355, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    11. Wiseman, Thomas, 2009. "Reputation and exogenous private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1352-1357, May.
    12. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games," Scholarly Articles 9962008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    13. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2019. "Stochastic games with hidden states," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), September.
    14. Pathikrit Basu & Kalyan Chatterjee & Tetsuya Hoshino & Omer Tamuz, 2018. "Repeated Coordination with Private Learning," Papers 1809.00051, arXiv.org.
    15. Harry Pei, 2020. "Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment," Papers 2006.08071, arXiv.org.
    16. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "Stochastic Games With Hidden States, Fourth Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-012, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 09 Nov 2017.
    17. Bhaskar, Venkataraman, 2012. "Dynamic Moral Hazard, Learning and Belief Manipulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 8948, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Andreas Blume & April Franco, 2002. "Learning from failure," Staff Report 299, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    19. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    20. Basu, Pathikrit & Chatterjee, Kalyan & Hoshino, Tetsuya & Tamuz, Omer, 2020. "Repeated coordination with private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    21. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2015. "Stochastic Games with Hidden States," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    22. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    23. Andreas Blume & April Franco & Paul Heidhues, 2006. "Rational Multi-Agent Search," 2006 Meeting Papers 776, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    24. Takuo Sugaya & Yuichi Yamamoto, 2019. "Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 19-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    25. Yukun Cheng & Xiaotie Deng & Dominik Scheder, 2018. "Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing," 4OR, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 231-260, September.
    26. Joyee Deb & Yuhta Ishii, 2016. "Reputation Building under Uncertain Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2042, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

  16. Mialon, Hugo M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2005. "The impact of gun laws: A model of crime and self-defense," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 170-175, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Khalil, Umair, 2017. "Do more guns lead to more crime? Understanding the role of illegal firearms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 342-361.
    2. Abdul Munasib & Genti Kostandini & Jeffrey L. Jordan, 2018. "Impact of the Stand Your Ground law on gun deaths: evidence of a rural urban dichotomy," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 527-554, June.
    3. David Fortunato, 2015. "Can Easing Concealed Carry Deter Crime?," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1071-1085, December.
    4. Lee, Kangoh, 2015. "Federalism, guns, and jurisdictional gun policies," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 141-153.
    5. Guha, Brishti, 2013. "Guns and crime revisited," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 1-10.
    6. Bac, Mehmet, 2010. "The interaction between potential criminals' and victims' demands for guns," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(5-6), pages 337-343, June.
    7. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2014. "Regulating harmless activity to fight crime," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 113(1), pages 79-95, September.

  17. Wiseman, Thomas & Yilankaya, Okan, 2001. "Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 216-242, October.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

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Statistics

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This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 4 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 1999-05-10 2005-12-01
  2. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 1999-05-10
  3. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2005-12-01
  4. NEP-DGE: Dynamic General Equilibrium (1) 2013-03-16
  5. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 1999-05-10
  6. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 1999-05-10
  7. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (1) 2004-07-04
  8. NEP-MON: Monetary Economics (1) 2013-03-16

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