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Thomas Wiseman

Personal Details

First Name:Thomas
Middle Name:
Last Name:Wiseman
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pwi274
https://sites.google.com/site/thomaswisemaneconomics/home
Terminal Degree:2001 Department of Economics; Northwestern University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of Texas-Austin

Austin, Texas (United States)
http://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/economics/
RePEc:edi:deutxus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Bhaskar, Venkataraman & Olszewski, Wojciech & Wiseman, Thomas, 2022. "Robust relational contracts with subjective performance evaluation," CEPR Discussion Papers 17312, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Taneva, Ina & Wiseman, Thomas, 2022. "Strategic Ignorance and Information Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 16892, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Kenneth Hendricks & Thomas Wiseman, 2021. "How To Sell (or Procure) in a Sequential Auction," Papers 2110.13121, arXiv.org.
  4. Thomas Wiseman, 2013. "Memory and the Limits of Money," Department of Economics Working Papers 130313, The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics.
  5. Thomas E. Wiseman, 2011. "A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Private Learning," 2011 Meeting Papers 181, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  6. Thomas Wiseman, 2006. "Reputation and Impermanent Types," 2006 Meeting Papers 650, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  7. Thomas Wiseman & R. Preston McAfee, 2005. "Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture," 2005 Meeting Papers 636, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  8. Li Gan & Roberton C. Williams III & Thomas Wiseman, 2004. "A Simple Model of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation," NBER Working Papers 10463, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Thomas Wiseman & Okan Yilankaya, 1999. "Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Discussion Papers 1248, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

Articles

  1. Krainin, Colin & Thomas, Caroline & Wiseman, Thomas, 2020. "Rational Quagmires: Attrition, Learning, and War," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 15(3), pages 369-400, July.
  2. Sperisen, Benjamin & Wiseman, Thomas, 2020. "Too good to fire: Non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 491-511.
  3. Dur, Umut Mert & Wiseman, Thomas, 2019. "School choice with neighbors," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 101-109.
  4. Wiseman, Thomas, 2018. "Competitive long-term health insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 144-150.
  5. Thomas Wiseman, 2017. "When Does Predation Dominate Collusion?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 555-584, March.
  6. Thomas Wiseman, 2015. "A Note on the Essentiality of Money under Limited Memory," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(4), pages 881-893, October.
  7. Peski, Marcin & Wiseman, Thomas, 2015. "A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
  8. Wiseman, Thomas, 2012. "A partial folk theorem for games with private learning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
  9. Kenneth Hendricks & Alan Sorensen & Thomas Wiseman, 2012. "Observational Learning and Demand for Search Goods," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 1-31, February.
  10. Kenneth Hendricks & Ilke Onur & Thomas Wiseman, 2012. "Last-Minute Bidding in Sequential Auctions with Unobserved, Stochastic Entry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 40(1), pages 1-19, February.
  11. Paal, Beatrix & Wiseman, Thomas, 2011. "Group insurance and lending with endogenous social collateral," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 30-40, January.
  12. Li Gan & Roberton C. Williams Iii & Thomas Wiseman, 2011. "A Simple Model Of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 49(3), pages 674-684, July.
  13. Geraghty, Thomas M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2011. "Conflict and compromise: Changes in U.S. strike outcomes, 1880 to 1945," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 519-537.
  14. Wiseman, Thomas, 2009. "Reputation and exogenous private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1352-1357, May.
  15. Thomas Wiseman, 2009. "Sequential Choice And Non-Bayesian Observational Learning," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 11(03), pages 285-300.
  16. Geraghty, Thomas M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Wage strikes in 1880s America: A test of the war of attrition model," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 303-326, September.
  17. Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Reputation and impermanent types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 190-210, January.
  18. Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Disagreement leads to complete learning: Sequential choice with continuous types," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 53-55, July.
  19. R. Preston Mcafee & Thomas Wiseman, 2008. "Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(1), pages 317-331.
  20. Mialon, Hugo M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2005. "The impact of gun laws: A model of crime and self-defense," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 170-175, August.
  21. Thomas Wiseman, 2005. "A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 629-645, March.
  22. Wiseman, Thomas & Yilankaya, Okan, 2001. "Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 216-242, October.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Wikipedia or ReplicationWiki mentions

(Only mentions on Wikipedia that link back to a page on a RePEc service)
  1. Kenneth Hendricks & Alan Sorensen & Thomas Wiseman, 2012. "Observational Learning and Demand for Search Goods," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 1-31, February.

    Mentioned in:

    1. Observational Learning and Demand for Search Goods (AEJ:MI 2012) in ReplicationWiki ()

Working papers

  1. Thomas E. Wiseman, 2011. "A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Private Learning," 2011 Meeting Papers 181, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. Tristan Tomala, 2013. "Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games," Post-Print hal-01026126, HAL.
    2. Sugaya, Takuo & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 0. "Common learning and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    3. Basu, Pathikrit & Chatterjee, Kalyan & Hoshino, Tetsuya & Tamuz, Omer, 2020. "Repeated coordination with private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    4. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2019. "Stochastic games with hidden states," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), September.
    5. Pathikrit Basu & Kalyan Chatterjee & Tetsuya Hoshino & Omer Tamuz, 2018. "Repeated Coordination with Private Learning," Papers 1809.00051, arXiv.org.
    6. Harry Pei, 2020. "Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment," Papers 2006.08071, arXiv.org.
    7. Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations," CESifo Working Paper Series 4700, CESifo.
    8. Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan & Hörner, Johannes, 2009. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," HEC Research Papers Series 921, HEC Paris.
    9. Brangewitz, Sonja & Giraud, Gael, 2016. "Learning in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games with Collateral and Incomplete Information," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 456, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    10. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "Stochastic Games With Hidden States, Fourth Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-012, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 09 Nov 2017.
    11. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "Stochastic Games with Hidden States, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-019, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Jun 2015.
    12. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2015. "Stochastic Games with Hidden States," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    13. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    14. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "We Can Cooperate Even When the Monitoring Structure Will Never Be Known," PIER Working Paper Archive 17-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Apr 2017.
    15. Takuo Sugaya & Yuichi Yamamoto, 2019. "Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 19-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    16. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from private information in noisy repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1733-1769, September.
    17. Françoise Forges, 2012. "Folk theorems for Bayesian (public good) games," Post-Print hal-02447604, HAL.
    18. Sonja Brangewitz & Gaël Giraud, 2012. "Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games with Default," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12062r, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, revised Oct 2013.
    19. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.

  2. Thomas Wiseman, 2006. "Reputation and Impermanent Types," 2006 Meeting Papers 650, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. Mehmet Ekmekci & Olivier Gossner & Andrea Wilson, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754608, HAL.
    2. Sharma, Priyanka, 2017. "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 269-283.
    3. Schottmüller, Christoph, 2019. "Too good to be truthful: Why competent advisers are fired," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 333-360.
    4. Hakenes, Hendrik & Katolnik, Svetlana, 2017. "On the incentive effects of job rotation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 424-441.
    5. Alp Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2009. "Reputation in Long-Run Relationships," Discussion Papers 1507, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan & Jérôme Renault, 2013. "Dynamic sender-receiver games," Post-Print hal-00804028, HAL.
    7. Ehud Lehrer & Dimitry Shaiderman, 2021. "Markovian Persuasion," Papers 2111.14365, arXiv.org.
    8. Monte, Daniel, 2013. "Bounded memory and permanent reputations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 345-354.
    9. Mehmet Ekmekci, 2010. "Sustainable Reputations with Rating Systems," Discussion Papers 1505, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    10. Andrew Mell, 2015. "Fooling Some of the People Some of the Time: Reputation Management and Optimal Betrayal," Economics Series Working Papers 770, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    11. Johannes Horner & Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2009. "On a Markov Game with One-Sided Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1737, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    12. Johannes Hörner & Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2010. "On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 58(4-part-2), pages 1107-1115, August.
    13. Liu, Qingmin & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2014. "Limited records and reputation bubbles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 2-29.
    14. Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2012. "Cycles of Distrust: An Economic Model," NBER Working Papers 18257, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Pierre Cardaliaguet & Catherine Rainer & Dinah Rosenberg & Nicolas Vieille, 2016. "Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information—The Limit Case," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 41(1), pages 49-71, February.
    16. Sperisen, Benjamin, 2018. "Bounded memory and incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 382-400.
    17. Dilmé, Francesc, 2019. "Reputation building through costly adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 586-626.
    18. Ehud Lehrer & Dimitry Shaiderman, 2022. "Markovian Persuasion with Stochastic Revelations," Papers 2204.08659, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    19. Benjamin Sperisen, 2018. "Bad Reputation Under Bounded And Fading Memory," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(1), pages 138-157, January.

  3. Thomas Wiseman & R. Preston McAfee, 2005. "Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture," 2005 Meeting Papers 636, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. Montero, Juan Pablo, 2011. "A note on environmental policy and innovation when governments cannot commit," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(S1), pages 13-19.
    2. Correia-da-Silva, João, 2021. "Optimal priority pricing by a durable goods monopolist," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 310-328.
    3. Roman Inderst, 2008. "Dynamic Bilateral Bargaining under Private Information with a Sequence of Potential Buyers," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(1), pages 220-236, January.
    4. Johannes Hörner & Larry Samuelson, 2011. "Managing Strategic Buyers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(3), pages 379-425.
    5. Ken Moon & Kostas Bimpikis & Haim Mendelson, 2018. "Randomized Markdowns and Online Monitoring," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(3), pages 1271-1290, March.
    6. Xing Li & Megan MacGarvie & Petra Moser, 2015. "Dead Poet's Property - How Does Copyright Influence Price?," NBER Working Papers 21522, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Seres, Gyula, 2019. "Uncertain Commitment Power in a Durable Good Monopoly," Other publications TiSEM bece5078-67ec-458b-807c-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. Richard F. Hartl & Peter M. Kort & Andrea Seidl, 2020. "Decisions on pricing, capacity investment, and introduction timing of new product generations in a durable-good monopoly," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 28(2), pages 497-519, June.
    9. Mak, Vincent & Rapoport, Amnon & Gisches, Eyran J., 2012. "Competitive dynamic pricing with alternating offers: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 250-264.
    10. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2019. "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," Papers 1904.07456, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
    11. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David G. & Stacchetti, Ennio, 2015. "One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
    12. Nava, Francesco & Schiraldi, Pasquale, 2019. "Differentiated durable goods monopoly: a robust Coase conjecture," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 90512, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    13. Ortner, Juan, 2017. "Durable goods monopoly with stochastic costs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    14. Xu, Frances Zhiyun, 2011. "Optimal best-price policy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 628-643, September.
    15. Luca Benzoni & Lorenzo Garlappi & Robert S. Goldstein & Julien Hugonnier & Chao Ying, 2020. "Optimal Debt Dynamics, Issuance Costs, and Commitment," Working Paper Series WP-2020-20, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    16. Yasushi Masuda & Seungjin Whang, 2021. "Digitization and profitability," Information Systems and e-Business Management, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 389-403, June.
    17. Wilner, Lionel, 2014. "Intertemporal price discrimination in infinite horizon," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 358-361.

  4. Li Gan & Roberton C. Williams III & Thomas Wiseman, 2004. "A Simple Model of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation," NBER Working Papers 10463, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Cited by:

    1. Dharmapala Dhammika & Garoupa Nuno & McAdams Richard H., 2009. "Belief in a Just World, Blaming the Victim, and Hate Crime Statutes," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 311-345, May.
    2. Nuno Garoupa & Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, 2006. "A law and economics perspective on terrorism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 147-168, July.
    3. Jason Chan & Anindya Ghose & Robert Seamans, 2013. "The Internet and Hate Crime: Offline Spillovers from Online Access," Working Papers 13-02, NET Institute.
    4. Ehud Guttel & Barak Medina, 2007. "Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions," Discussion Paper Series dp472, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    5. Ehud Guttel & Barak Medina, 2007. "Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001799, UCLA Department of Economics.

  5. Thomas Wiseman & Okan Yilankaya, 1999. "Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Discussion Papers 1248, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Heller, Yuval & Mohlin, Erik, 2014. "Coevolution of Deception and Preferences: Darwin and Nash Meet Machiavelli," MPRA Paper 58255, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Kevin McCabe & Mary Rigdon & Vernon Smith, 2004. "Sustaining Cooperation in trust Games," Experimental 0403005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Philippe Grégoire & Arthur Robson, 2003. "Imitation, Group Selection and Cooperation," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(03), pages 229-247.
    4. Man, Priscilla T.Y., 2012. "Efficiency and stochastic stability in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 272-284.

Articles

  1. Dur, Umut Mert & Wiseman, Thomas, 2019. "School choice with neighbors," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 101-109.

    Cited by:

    1. Hong, Miho & Park, Jaeok, 2022. "Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    2. Jörgen Kratz, 2017. "Overlapping multiple object assignments," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(3), pages 723-753, March.
    3. Itai Ashlagi & Peng Shi, 2014. "Improving Community Cohesion in School Choice via Correlated-Lottery Implementation," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 62(6), pages 1247-1264, December.
    4. Nadja Stroh-Maraun, 2020. "Pareto Efficiency in Weighted School Choice Problems," Working Papers Dissertations 64, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
    5. William PHAN & Ryan TIERNEY & Yu ZHOU, 2021. "Crowding in School Choice," Discussion papers e-21-006, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
    6. Fisher, James C.D., 2020. "Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: A topological approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 136-140.

  2. Thomas Wiseman, 2017. "When Does Predation Dominate Collusion?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 555-584, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Guillem Roig, 2021. "Collusive equilibria with switching costs: The effect of consumer concentration," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 100-121, February.
    2. Argenton, Cédric, 2019. "Colluding on excluding," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 194-206.
    3. Dou, Winston Wei & Ji, Yan & Wu, Wei, 2021. "Competition, profitability, and discount rates," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(2), pages 582-620.

  3. Thomas Wiseman, 2015. "A Note on the Essentiality of Money under Limited Memory," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(4), pages 881-893, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Gomis-Porqueras, Pedro & Sun, Ching-jen, 2019. "Fiat Money as a Public Signal, Medium of Exchange, and Punishment," MPRA Paper 94327, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  4. Peski, Marcin & Wiseman, Thomas, 2015. "A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.

    Cited by:

    1. Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2014. "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000881, David K. Levine.
    2. Dutta, Prajit K. & Siconolfi, Paolo, 2019. "Asynchronous games with transfers: Uniqueness and optimality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 46-75.
    3. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2019. "Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
    4. Pierre Cardaliaguet & Catherine Rainer & Dinah Rosenberg & Nicolas Vieille, 2016. "Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information—The Limit Case," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 41(1), pages 49-71, February.

  5. Wiseman, Thomas, 2012. "A partial folk theorem for games with private learning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Kenneth Hendricks & Alan Sorensen & Thomas Wiseman, 2012. "Observational Learning and Demand for Search Goods," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 1-31, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Masatlioglu, Yusufcan & Nakajima, Daisuke, 2013. "Choice by iterative search," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.
    2. Herrera, Helios & Hörner, Johannes, 2013. "Biased social learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 131-146.
    3. Sebastian Linde & Ralph Siebert, 2021. "Exploring the Heterogeneous Effects of State Price Transparency Laws on Charge Prices, Negotiated Prices, and Operating Costs," CESifo Working Paper Series 9348, CESifo.
    4. Matthew Grennan & Ashley Swanson, 2016. "Transparency and Negotiated Prices: The Value of Information in Hospital-Supplier Bargaining," NBER Working Papers 22039, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Ignacio Monzon & Michael Rapp, 2011. "Observational Learning with Position Uncertainty," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 206, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    6. Zachary Mahone & Filippo Rebessi, 2019. "Consumer Learning and Firm Dynamics," Department of Economics Working Papers 2019-08, McMaster University.
    7. He, Qiao-Chu & Chen, Ying-Ju, 2018. "Dynamic pricing of electronic products with consumer reviews," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 123-134.
    8. Simon Board & Moritz Meyer‐ter‐Vehn, 2021. "Learning Dynamics in Social Networks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(6), pages 2601-2635, November.
    9. Liangfei Qiu & Asoo Vakharia & Arunima Chhikara, 2019. "Multi-Dimensional Observational Learning in Social Networks: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 19-01, NET Institute.
    10. Daniel Garcia & Sandro Shelegia, 2018. "Consumer search with observational learning," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(1), pages 224-253, March.
    11. Ken Hendricks & Alan Sorensen, 2009. "Information and the Skewness of Music Sales," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(2), pages 324-369, April.
    12. Andrew T. Ching & Tülin Erdem & Michael P. Keane, 2016. "Empirical Models of Learning Dynamics: A Survey of Recent Developments," Economics Papers 2016-W12, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    13. Jin-Hyuk Kim & Peter Newberry & Calvin Qiu, 2015. "An Empirical Analysis of a Crowdfunding Platform," Working Papers 15-12, NET Institute.
    14. Essling, Christian & Könen, Johannes & Peukert, Christian, 2017. "Competition for attention in the digital age: The case of single releases in the recorded music industry," Munich Reprints in Economics 49913, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    15. Ali, S. Nageeb, 2018. "Herding with costly information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 713-729.
    16. Babur De los Santos & Sergei Koulayev, 2012. "Optimizing Click-through in Online Rankings for Partially Anonymous Consumers," Working Papers 2012-04, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    17. Song, Yangbo, 2016. "Social learning with endogenous observation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 324-333.
    18. Bobkova, Nina & Mass, Helene, 2022. "Two-dimensional information acquisition in social learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
    19. Kaufman, Noah, 2014. "Overcoming the barriers to the market performance of green consumer goods," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 487-507.
    20. Jin Huang, 2017. "To Glance or to Peruse: Observational and Active Learning from Peer Consumers," Working Papers wp2017_1716, CEMFI.
    21. Jerker Denrell & Gaël Le Mens, 2017. "Information Sampling, Belief Synchronization, and Collective Illusions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(2), pages 528-547, February.

  7. Kenneth Hendricks & Ilke Onur & Thomas Wiseman, 2012. "Last-Minute Bidding in Sequential Auctions with Unobserved, Stochastic Entry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 40(1), pages 1-19, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Dominic Coey & Bradley Larsen & Brennan Platt, 2016. "Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search," NBER Working Papers 22038, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Backus, Matthew R. & Podwol, Joseph Uri & Schneider, Henry S., 2014. "Search costs and equilibrium price dispersion in auction markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 173-192.
    3. Said, Maher, 2012. "Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2419-2438.
    4. Onur, Ilke & Velamuri, Malathi, 2014. "Competition, endogeneity and the winning bid: An empirical analysis of eBay auctions," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 68-74.

  8. Paal, Beatrix & Wiseman, Thomas, 2011. "Group insurance and lending with endogenous social collateral," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 30-40, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Shoji, Masahiro & Aoyagi, Keitaro & Kasahara, Ryuji & Sawada, Yasuyuki & Ueyama, Mika, 2012. "Social Capital Formation and Credit Access: Evidence from Sri Lanka," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(12), pages 2522-2536.
    2. Chowdhury, Shyamal & Chowdhury, Prabal Roy & Sengupta, Kunal, 2014. "Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 167-180.
    3. Ahlin, Christian & Jiang, Neville, 2008. "Can micro-credit bring development?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 1-21, April.
    4. Ernan Rustiadi & Ahmadriswan Nasution, 2017. "Can Social Capital Investment Reduce Poverty in Rural Indonesia?," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 7(2), pages 109-117.
    5. A. Blanco-Oliver & A. Irimia-Diéguez, 2021. "Impact of outreach on financial performance of microfinance institutions: a moderated mediation model of productivity, loan portfolio quality, and profit status," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 633-668, April.
    6. Tong Zhang & Huiting Liu & Pinghan Liang, 2020. "Social Trust Formation and Credit Accessibility—Evidence from Rural Households in China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-14, January.
    7. Shyamal Chowdhury & Prabal Roy Chowdhury & Kunal Sengupta, 2014. "Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance," Discussion Papers 14-07, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    8. Sana Ullah & Muhammad Tariq Majeed & Babur Wasim Arif, 2021. "Social capital and firms’ choice of financing under credit constraints: microeconomic evidence from Pakistan," DECISION: Official Journal of the Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Springer;Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, vol. 48(1), pages 3-13, March.
    9. Janssens, Wendy & Kramer, Berber, 2016. "The social dilemma of microinsurance: Free-riding in a framed field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PB), pages 47-61.
    10. Liu, Zhengchi & Shang, Jennifer & Wu, Shin-yi & Chen, Pei-yu, 2020. "Social collateral, soft information and online peer-to-peer lending: A theoretical model," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 281(2), pages 428-438.

  9. Li Gan & Roberton C. Williams Iii & Thomas Wiseman, 2011. "A Simple Model Of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 49(3), pages 674-684, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  10. Geraghty, Thomas M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2011. "Conflict and compromise: Changes in U.S. strike outcomes, 1880 to 1945," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 519-537.

    Cited by:

    1. Molinder, Jakob & Karlsson, Tobias & Enflo, Kerstin, 2022. "Social democracy and the decline of strikes," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    2. Enflo, Kerstin & Karlsson, Tobias, 2018. "From Conflict to Compromise: The importance of mediation in Swedish work stoppages 1907-1927," CEPR Discussion Papers 12586, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Stefan Oliver Houpt & Juan Carlos Rojo Cagigal, 2014. "Relative deprivation and labour conflict during Spain’s industrialization: the Bilbao estuary, 1914–1936," Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 8(3), pages 335-369, September.

  11. Wiseman, Thomas, 2009. "Reputation and exogenous private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1352-1357, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Mehmet Ekmekci & Olivier Gossner & Andrea Wilson, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754608, HAL.
    2. Sharma, Priyanka, 2017. "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 269-283.
    3. Jesper Rudiger & Adrien Vigier, 2015. "Pundits and Quacks," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1997, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. Hu, Ju, 2014. "Reputation in the presence of noisy exogenous learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 64-73.
    5. Huang, Chong, 2017. "Defending against speculative attacks: The policy maker's reputation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 1-34.
    6. Mehmet Ekmekci, 2010. "Sustainable Reputations with Rating Systems," Discussion Papers 1505, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. Ju Hu, 2013. "Reputation in the Presence of Noisy Exogenous Learning," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-009, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    8. Chong Huang, 2011. "Defending Against Speculative Attacks: Reputation, Learning, and Coordination," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-039, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.

  12. Geraghty, Thomas M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Wage strikes in 1880s America: A test of the war of attrition model," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 303-326, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Pantsios, Archontis L. & Polachek, Solomon, 2017. "How Asymmetrically Increasing Joint Strike Costs Need Not Lead to Fewer Strikes," IZA Discussion Papers 10723, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Molinder, Jakob & Karlsson, Tobias & Enflo, Kerstin, 2022. "Social democracy and the decline of strikes," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    3. Enflo, Kerstin & Karlsson, Tobias, 2018. "From Conflict to Compromise: The importance of mediation in Swedish work stoppages 1907-1927," CEPR Discussion Papers 12586, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Stefan Oliver Houpt & Juan Carlos Rojo Cagigal, 2014. "Relative deprivation and labour conflict during Spain’s industrialization: the Bilbao estuary, 1914–1936," Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 8(3), pages 335-369, September.
    5. Michele Campolieti, 2021. "Strikes in British Coal Mining, 1893–1940: Testing Models of Strikes," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 243-273, April.
    6. Geraghty, Thomas M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2011. "Conflict and compromise: Changes in U.S. strike outcomes, 1880 to 1945," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 519-537.
    7. Kyung nok Chun & Zachary Schaller & Stergios Skaperdas, 2020. "Why Are There Strikes?," CESifo Working Paper Series 8620, CESifo.

  13. Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Reputation and impermanent types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 190-210, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  14. R. Preston Mcafee & Thomas Wiseman, 2008. "Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(1), pages 317-331.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  15. Mialon, Hugo M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2005. "The impact of gun laws: A model of crime and self-defense," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 170-175, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Khalil, Umair, 2017. "Do more guns lead to more crime? Understanding the role of illegal firearms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 342-361.
    2. David Fortunato, 2015. "Can Easing Concealed Carry Deter Crime?," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1071-1085, December.
    3. Petros Sekeris & Tanguy van Ypersele, 2020. "An Economic Analysis of Violent Crim," Post-Print hal-03607608, HAL.
    4. Lee, Kangoh, 2015. "Federalism, guns, and jurisdictional gun policies," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 141-153.
    5. Abdul Munasib & Genti Kostandini & Jeffrey L. Jordan, 2018. "Impact of the Stand Your Ground law on gun deaths: evidence of a rural urban dichotomy," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 527-554, June.
    6. Guha, Brishti, 2013. "Guns and crime revisited," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 1-10.
    7. Oliveira Cristiano & Balbinotto Neto Giácomo, 2015. "The Deterrence Effects of Gun Laws in Games with Asymmetric Skills and Information," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 435-452, November.
    8. Bac, Mehmet, 2010. "The interaction between potential criminals' and victims' demands for guns," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(5-6), pages 337-343, June.
    9. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2014. "Regulating harmless activity to fight crime," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 113(1), pages 79-95, September.

  16. Thomas Wiseman, 2005. "A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 629-645, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Tristan Tomala, 2013. "Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games," Post-Print hal-01026126, HAL.
    2. Sugaya, Takuo & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 0. "Common learning and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    3. Basu, Pathikrit & Chatterjee, Kalyan & Hoshino, Tetsuya & Tamuz, Omer, 2020. "Repeated coordination with private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    4. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2019. "Stochastic games with hidden states," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), September.
    5. Sylvain Chassang, 2010. "Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 448-465, March.
    6. Heidhues, Paul & Blume, Andreas & Franco, April, 2013. "Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80027, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Pathikrit Basu & Kalyan Chatterjee & Tetsuya Hoshino & Omer Tamuz, 2018. "Repeated Coordination with Private Learning," Papers 1809.00051, arXiv.org.
    8. Harry Pei, 2020. "Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment," Papers 2006.08071, arXiv.org.
    9. Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2013. "Strategic information exchange," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 444-467.
    10. Brangewitz, Sonja & Giraud, Gael, 2016. "Learning in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games with Collateral and Incomplete Information," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 456, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    11. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "Stochastic Games With Hidden States, Fourth Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-012, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 09 Nov 2017.
    12. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "Stochastic Games with Hidden States, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-019, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Jun 2015.
    13. Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2006. "Common Learning," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000355, UCLA Department of Economics.
    14. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2015. "Stochastic Games with Hidden States," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    15. Bhaskar, Venkataraman, 2012. "Dynamic Moral Hazard, Learning and Belief Manipulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 8948, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "Stochastic Games with Hidden States, Fifth version," PIER Working Paper Archive 18-028, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 19 May 2018.
    17. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    18. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "We Can Cooperate Even When the Monitoring Structure Will Never Be Known," PIER Working Paper Archive 17-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Apr 2017.
    19. Andreas Blume & April Franco & Paul Heidhues, 2006. "Rational Multi-Agent Search," 2006 Meeting Papers 776, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    20. Yukun Cheng & Xiaotie Deng & Dominik Scheder, 2022. "Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 314(1), pages 49-76, July.
    21. Takuo Sugaya & Yuichi Yamamoto, 2019. "Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 19-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    22. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from private information in noisy repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1733-1769, September.
    23. Yukun Cheng & Xiaotie Deng & Dominik Scheder, 2018. "Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing," 4OR, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 231-260, September.
    24. Andreas Blume & April Franco, 2002. "Learning from failure," Staff Report 299, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    25. Joyee Deb & Yuhta Ishii, 2016. "Reputation Building under Uncertain Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2042, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    26. Wiseman, Thomas, 2009. "Reputation and exogenous private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1352-1357, May.
    27. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.

  17. Wiseman, Thomas & Yilankaya, Okan, 2001. "Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 216-242, October.
    See citations under working paper version above.

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This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 5 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 1999-05-10 2005-12-01 2021-11-01
  2. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (2) 2005-12-01 2021-11-01
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 1999-05-10 2021-11-01
  4. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 1999-05-10
  5. NEP-DES: Economic Design (1) 2021-11-01
  6. NEP-DGE: Dynamic General Equilibrium (1) 2013-03-16
  7. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 1999-05-10
  8. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (1) 2004-07-04
  9. NEP-MON: Monetary Economics (1) 2013-03-16

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