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Thomas Wiseman

Personal Details

First Name:Thomas
Middle Name:
Last Name:Wiseman
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pwi274
https://webspace.utexas.edu/wisemant/www/
Terminal Degree:2001 Department of Economics; Northwestern University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of Texas-Austin

Austin, Texas (United States)
http://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/economics/

: +1 (512) 471-3211
+1 (512) 471-3510
Austin, Texas 78712
RePEc:edi:deutxus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Thomas Wiseman, 2013. "Memory and the Limits of Money," Department of Economics Working Papers 130313, The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics.
  2. Thomas E. Wiseman, 2011. "A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Private Learning," 2011 Meeting Papers 181, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  3. Thomas Wiseman, 2006. "Reputation and Impermanent Types," 2006 Meeting Papers 650, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. Thomas Wiseman & R. Preston McAfee, 2005. "Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture," 2005 Meeting Papers 636, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  5. Li Gan & Roberton C. Williams III & Thomas Wiseman, 2004. "A Simple Model of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation," NBER Working Papers 10463, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Hugo Mialon & Tom Wiseman, 2004. "The Impact of Gun Laws: A Model of Crime and Self-defense," Emory Economics 0412, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
  7. Thomas Wiseman & Okan Yilankaya, 1999. "Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Discussion Papers 1248, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

Articles

  1. Thomas Wiseman, 2017. "When Does Predation Dominate Collusion?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 555-584, March.
  2. Thomas Wiseman, 2015. "A Note on the Essentiality of Money under Limited Memory," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(4), pages 881-893, October.
  3. Wiseman, Thomas & Peski, Marcin, 2015. "A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
  4. Kenneth Hendricks & Alan Sorensen & Thomas Wiseman, 2012. "Observational Learning and Demand for Search Goods," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 1-31, February.
  5. Kenneth Hendricks & Ilke Onur & Thomas Wiseman, 2012. "Last-Minute Bidding in Sequential Auctions with Unobserved, Stochastic Entry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 40(1), pages 1-19, February.
  6. Wiseman, Thomas, 2012. "A partial folk theorem for games with private learning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
  7. Paal, Beatrix & Wiseman, Thomas, 2011. "Group insurance and lending with endogenous social collateral," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 30-40, January.
  8. Li Gan & Roberton C. Williams Iii & Thomas Wiseman, 2011. "A Simple Model Of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 49(3), pages 674-684, July.
  9. Geraghty, Thomas M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2011. "Conflict and compromise: Changes in U.S. strike outcomes, 1880 to 1945," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 519-537.
  10. Wiseman, Thomas, 2009. "Reputation and exogenous private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1352-1357, May.
  11. Thomas Wiseman, 2009. "Sequential Choice And Non-Bayesian Observational Learning," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 11(03), pages 285-300.
  12. Geraghty, Thomas M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Wage strikes in 1880s America: A test of the war of attrition model," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 303-326, September.
  13. Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Reputation and impermanent types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 190-210, January.
  14. R. Preston Mcafee & Thomas Wiseman, 2008. "Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(1), pages 317-331.
  15. Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Disagreement leads to complete learning: Sequential choice with continuous types," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 53-55, July.
  16. Thomas Wiseman, 2005. "A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 629-645, March.
  17. Mialon, Hugo M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2005. "The impact of gun laws: A model of crime and self-defense," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 170-175, August.
  18. Wiseman, Thomas & Yilankaya, Okan, 2001. "Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 216-242, October.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Wikipedia mentions

(Only mentions on Wikipedia that link back to a page on a RePEc service)
  1. Kenneth Hendricks & Alan Sorensen & Thomas Wiseman, 2012. "Observational Learning and Demand for Search Goods," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 1-31, February.

    Mentioned in:

    1. Observational Learning and Demand for Search Goods (AEJ:MI 2012) in ReplicationWiki ()

Working papers

  1. Thomas E. Wiseman, 2011. "A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Private Learning," 2011 Meeting Papers 181, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations," CESifo Working Paper Series 4700, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Post-Print hal-00630299, HAL.
    3. Brangewitz, Sonja & Giraud, Gael, 2016. "Learning in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games with Collateral and Incomplete Information," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 456, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    4. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games," Scholarly Articles 9962008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    5. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    6. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2015. "Stochastic Games with Hidden States," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    7. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    8. Sonja Brangewitz & Gaël Giraud, 2012. "Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games with Default," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12062r, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, revised Oct 2013.

  2. Thomas Wiseman, 2006. "Reputation and Impermanent Types," 2006 Meeting Papers 650, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. Mehmet Ekmekci & Olivier Gossner & Andrea Wilson, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754608, HAL.
    2. Liu, Qingmin & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2014. "Limited records and reputation bubbles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 2-29.
    3. Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2012. "Cycles of Distrust: An Economic Model," NBER Working Papers 18257, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Sharma, Priyanka, 2017. "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 269-283.
    5. Hakenes, Hendrik & Katolnik, Svetlana, 2017. "On the incentive effects of job rotation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 424-441.
    6. Mehmet Ekmekci, 2010. "Sustainable Reputations with Rating Systems," Discussion Papers 1505, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. Andrew Mell, 2015. "Fooling Some of the People Some of the Time: Reputation Management and Optimal Betrayal," Economics Series Working Papers 770, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    8. Alp Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2009. "Reputation in Long-Run Relationships," Discussion Papers 1507, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    9. Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan & Jérôme Renault, 2013. "Dynamic sender-receiver games," Post-Print hal-00804028, HAL.
    10. Monte, Daniel, 2013. "Bounded memory and permanent reputations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 345-354.
    11. Johannes Horner & Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2009. "On a Markov Game with One-Sided Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1737, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

  3. Thomas Wiseman & R. Preston McAfee, 2005. "Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture," 2005 Meeting Papers 636, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. Johannes Hörner & Larry Samuelson, 2011. "Managing Strategic Buyers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(3), pages 379-425.
    2. Xing Li & Megan MacGarvie & Petra Moser, 2015. "Dead Poet's Property - How Does Copyright Influence Price?," NBER Working Papers 21522, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Xu, Frances Zhiyun, 2011. "Optimal best-price policy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 628-643, September.
    4. Wilner, Lionel, 2014. "Intertemporal price discrimination in infinite horizon," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 358-361.
    5. Montero, Juan Pablo, 2011. "A note on environmental policy and innovation when governments cannot commit," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(S1), pages 13-19.
    6. Roman Inderst, 2008. "Dynamic Bilateral Bargaining under Private Information with a Sequence of Potential Buyers," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(1), pages 220-236, January.
    7. Mak, Vincent & Rapoport, Amnon & Gisches, Eyran J., 2012. "Competitive dynamic pricing with alternating offers: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 250-264.
    8. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David G. & Stacchetti, Ennio, 2015. "One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
    9. Ortner, Juan, 2017. "Durable goods monopoly with stochastic costs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.

  4. Li Gan & Roberton C. Williams III & Thomas Wiseman, 2004. "A Simple Model of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation," NBER Working Papers 10463, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Cited by:

    1. Jason Chan & Anindya Ghose & Robert Seamans, 2013. "The Internet and Hate Crime: Offline Spillovers from Online Access," Working Papers 13-02, NET Institute.
    2. Ehud Guttel & Barak Medina, 2007. "Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions," Discussion Paper Series dp472, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    3. Ehud Guttel & Barak Medina, 2007. "Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001799, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. Dharmapala Dhammika & Garoupa Nuno & McAdams Richard H., 2009. "Belief in a Just World, Blaming the Victim, and Hate Crime Statutes," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 311-345, May.
    5. Francesco Parisi & Jonathan Klick & Nuno Garoupa, 2006. "A Law and Economics Perspective on Terrorism," Working Papers 2006-09, FEDEA.

  5. Hugo Mialon & Tom Wiseman, 2004. "The Impact of Gun Laws: A Model of Crime and Self-defense," Emory Economics 0412, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).

    Cited by:

    1. Khalil, Umair, 2017. "Do more guns lead to more crime? Understanding the role of illegal firearms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 342-361.
    2. Lee, Kangoh, 2015. "Federalism, guns, and jurisdictional gun policies," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 141-153.
    3. Guha, Brishti, 2013. "Guns and crime revisited," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 1-10.
    4. Oliveira Cristiano & Balbinotto Neto Giácomo, 2015. "The Deterrence Effects of Gun Laws in Games with Asymmetric Skills and Information," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 435-452, November.
    5. Bac, Mehmet, 2010. "The interaction between potential criminals' and victims' demands for guns," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(5-6), pages 337-343, June.
    6. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2014. "Regulating harmless activity to fight crime," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 113(1), pages 79-95, September.

  6. Thomas Wiseman & Okan Yilankaya, 1999. "Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Discussion Papers 1248, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Kevin McCabe & Mary Rigdon & Vernon Smith, 2004. "Sustaining Cooperation in trust Games," Experimental 0403005, EconWPA.
    2. Philippe Grégoire & Arthur Robson, 2003. "Imitation, Group Selection and Cooperation," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(03), pages 229-247.
    3. Man, Priscilla T.Y., 2012. "Efficiency and stochastic stability in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 272-284.

Articles

  1. Wiseman, Thomas & Peski, Marcin, 2015. "A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.

    Cited by:

    1. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan, 2016. "Protocol Invariance and the Timing of Decisions in Dynamic Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 11447, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2013. "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1933R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2015.

  2. Kenneth Hendricks & Alan Sorensen & Thomas Wiseman, 2012. "Observational Learning and Demand for Search Goods," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 1-31, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Helios Herrera & Johannes Horner, 2009. "Biased Social Learning," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1738, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Matthew Grennan & Ashley Swanson, 2016. "Transparency and Negotiated Prices: The Value of Information in Hospital-Supplier Bargaining," NBER Working Papers 22039, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Ken Hendricks & Alan Sorensen, 2009. "Information and the Skewness of Music Sales," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(2), pages 324-369, April.
    4. Jin-Hyuk Kim & Peter Newberry & Calvin Qiu, 2015. "An Empirical Analysis of a Crowdfunding Platform," Working Papers 15-12, NET Institute.
    5. Song, Yangbo, 2016. "Social learning with endogenous observation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 324-333.
    6. Monzón, Ignacio & Rapp, Michael, 2014. "Observational learning with position uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 375-402.
    7. Andrew T. Ching & Tülin Erdem & Michael P. Keane, 2016. "Empirical Models of Learning Dynamics: A Survey of Recent Developments," Economics Papers 2016-W12, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    8. Babur De los Santos & Sergei Koulayev, 2012. "Optimizing Click-through in Online Rankings for Partially Anonymous Consumers," Working Papers 2012-04, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    9. Essling, Christian & Koenen, Johannes & Peukert, Christian, 2017. "Competition for attention in the digital age: The case of single releases in the recorded music industry," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 26-40.
    10. Kaufman, Noah, 2014. "Overcoming the barriers to the market performance of green consumer goods," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 487-507.
    11. Nakajima, Daisuke & Masatlioglu, Yusufcan, 2013. "Choice by iterative search," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.
    12. Sandro Shelegia & Daniel Garcia, 2015. "Consumer Search with Observational Learning," Vienna Economics Papers 1502, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.

  3. Kenneth Hendricks & Ilke Onur & Thomas Wiseman, 2012. "Last-Minute Bidding in Sequential Auctions with Unobserved, Stochastic Entry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 40(1), pages 1-19, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Dominic Coey & Bradley Larsen & Brennan Platt, 2016. "A Theory of Bidding Dynamics and Deadlines in Online Retail," NBER Working Papers 22038, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Said, Maher, 2008. "Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization," MPRA Paper 11456, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Backus, Matthew R. & Podwol, Joseph Uri & Schneider, Henry S., 2014. "Search costs and equilibrium price dispersion in auction markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 173-192.
    4. Onur, Ilke & Velamuri, Malathi, 2014. "Competition, endogeneity and the winning bid: An empirical analysis of eBay auctions," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 68-74.

  4. Wiseman, Thomas, 2012. "A partial folk theorem for games with private learning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Paal, Beatrix & Wiseman, Thomas, 2011. "Group insurance and lending with endogenous social collateral," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 30-40, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Chowdhury, Shyamal & Chowdhury, Prabal Roy & Sengupta, Kunal, 2014. "Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 167-180.
    2. Janssens, Wendy & Kramer, Berber, 2016. "The social dilemma of microinsurance: Free-riding in a framed field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PB), pages 47-61.
    3. Ernan Rustiadi & Ahmadriswan Nasution, 2017. "Can Social Capital Investment Reduce Poverty in Rural Indonesia?," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 7(2), pages 109-117.
    4. Shoji, Masahiro & Aoyagi, Keitaro & Kasahara, Ryuji & Sawada, Yasuyuki & Ueyama, Mika, 2012. "Social Capital Formation and Credit Access: Evidence from Sri Lanka," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(12), pages 2522-2536.
    5. Christian Ahlin & Neville Jiang, 2005. "Can Micro-Credit Bring Development?," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 05019, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.

  6. Li Gan & Roberton C. Williams Iii & Thomas Wiseman, 2011. "A Simple Model Of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 49(3), pages 674-684, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Geraghty, Thomas M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2011. "Conflict and compromise: Changes in U.S. strike outcomes, 1880 to 1945," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 519-537.

    Cited by:

    1. Stefan Oliver Houpt & Juan Carlos Rojo Cagigal, 2014. "Relative deprivation and labour conflict during Spain’s industrialization: the Bilbao estuary, 1914–1936," Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 8(3), pages 335-369, September.

  8. Wiseman, Thomas, 2009. "Reputation and exogenous private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1352-1357, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Mehmet Ekmekci & Olivier Gossner & Andrea Wilson, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754608, HAL.
    2. Sharma, Priyanka, 2017. "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 269-283.
    3. Jesper Rudiger & Adrien Vigier, 2015. "Pundits and Quacks," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1997, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. Hu, Ju, 2014. "Reputation in the presence of noisy exogenous learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 64-73.
    5. Mehmet Ekmekci, 2010. "Sustainable Reputations with Rating Systems," Discussion Papers 1505, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. Ju Hu, 2013. "Reputation in the Presence of Noisy Exogenous Learning," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-009, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    7. Huang, Chong, 2017. "Defending against speculative attacks: The policy maker's reputation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 1-34.
    8. Chong Huang, 2011. "Defending Against Speculative Attacks: Reputation, Learning, and Coordination," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-039, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.

  9. Geraghty, Thomas M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Wage strikes in 1880s America: A test of the war of attrition model," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 303-326, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Stefan Oliver Houpt & Juan Carlos Rojo Cagigal, 2014. "Relative deprivation and labour conflict during Spain’s industrialization: the Bilbao estuary, 1914–1936," Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 8(3), pages 335-369, September.
    2. Pantsios, Archontis L. & Polachek, Solomon, 2017. "How Asymmetrically Increasing Joint Strike Costs Need Not Lead to Fewer Strikes," IZA Discussion Papers 10723, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    3. Geraghty, Thomas M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2011. "Conflict and compromise: Changes in U.S. strike outcomes, 1880 to 1945," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 519-537.

  10. Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Reputation and impermanent types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 190-210, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  11. R. Preston Mcafee & Thomas Wiseman, 2008. "Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(1), pages 317-331.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  12. Thomas Wiseman, 2005. "A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 629-645, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Sylvain Chassang, 2010. "Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 448-465, March.
    2. Brangewitz, Sonja & Giraud, Gael, 2016. "Learning in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games with Collateral and Incomplete Information," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 456, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    3. Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille , Nicolas, 2013. "Strategic Information Exchange," Les Cahiers de Recherche 1009, HEC Paris.
    4. Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2006. "Common Learning," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1575R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2007.
    5. Blume, Andreas & Franco, April Mitchell & Heidhues, Paul, 2011. "Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 355, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    6. Wiseman, Thomas, 2009. "Reputation and exogenous private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1352-1357, May.
    7. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games," Scholarly Articles 9962008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    8. Bhaskar, Venkataraman, 2012. "Dynamic Moral Hazard, Learning and Belief Manipulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 8948, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Andreas Blume & April Franco, 2002. "Learning from failure," Staff Report 299, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    10. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    11. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2015. "Stochastic Games with Hidden States," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    12. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    13. Andreas Blume & April Franco & Paul Heidhues, 2006. "Rational Multi-Agent Search," 2006 Meeting Papers 776, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. Joyee Deb & Yuhta Ishii, 2016. "Reputation Building under Uncertain Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2042, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

  13. Mialon, Hugo M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2005. "The impact of gun laws: A model of crime and self-defense," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 170-175, August.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  14. Wiseman, Thomas & Yilankaya, Okan, 2001. "Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 216-242, October.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 6 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (2) 2004-07-04 2004-10-21
  2. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 1999-05-10
  3. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2005-12-01
  4. NEP-DGE: Dynamic General Equilibrium (1) 2013-03-16
  5. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 1999-05-10
  6. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 1999-05-10
  7. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2005-12-01
  8. NEP-MON: Monetary Economics (1) 2013-03-16
  9. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2004-10-21

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