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Report NEP-DES-2021-11-01
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Kenneth Hendricks & Thomas Wiseman, 2021, "How To Sell (or Procure) in a Sequential Auction," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2110.13121, Oct.
- Guillaume Pommey, 2021, "Partnership Dissolution with Cash-Constrained Agents," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 514, Oct, revised 10 Oct 2021.
- Agustin G. Bonifacio & Noelia Juarez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2021, "Cycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2110.11846, Oct, revised Mar 2022.
- Kamesh Munagala & Yiheng Shen & Kangning Wang & Zhiyi Wang, 2021, "Approximate Core for Committee Selection via Multilinear Extension and Market Clearing," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2110.12499, Oct.
- Nikhil Agarwal & Eric Budish, 2021, "Market Design," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 29367, Oct.