Computationally restricted unmediated talk under incomplete information
We show the role of unmediated talk with computational complexity bounds as both an information transmission and a coordination device for the class of two-player games with incomplete information and rational parameters. We prove that any communication equilibrium payoff of such games can be reached as a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium payoff of the game extended by a two phase universal mechanism of interim computationally restricted pre-play communication. The communication protocols are designed with the help of modern cryptographic tools. A familiar context in which our results could be applied is bilateral trading with incomplete information. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004
Volume (Year): 23 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (January)
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