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Credibility and Seigniorage in a Common Currency Area

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  • Bottazzi, Laura
  • Manasse, Paolo

Abstract

In the paper we show that common currency areas tend to amplify the inefficiencies associated with lack of credibility of monetary policy. Lack of commitment in redistribution of seigniorage leads to excessive inflation and suboptimal taxation in the Monetary Union. Lack of commitment to inflation creates multiple inefficient equilibria that do not exist in a regime of national monetary independence.

Suggested Citation

  • Bottazzi, Laura & Manasse, Paolo, 2002. "Credibility and Seigniorage in a Common Currency Area," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 34(4), pages 1034-1046, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:34:y:2002:i:4:p:1034-46
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sinn, Hans-Werner & Feist, Holger, 1997. "Eurowinners and Eurolosers: The distribution of seigniorage wealth in EMU1," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 665-689, December.
    2. Russell Cooper & Andrew John, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-463.
    3. Feenstra, Robert C., 1986. "Functional equivalence between liquidity costs and the utility of money," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 271-291, March.
    4. Hans-Werner Sinn & Holger Feist, 1997. "Eurowinners and Eurolosers: The Distribution of Seignorage Wealth in EMU," CESifo Working Paper Series 134, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Sibert, Anne, 1992. "Government finance in a common currency area," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(6), pages 567-578, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Emmanuel Farhi & Iván Werning, 2017. "Fiscal Unions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(12), pages 3788-3834, December.
    2. Bottazzi, Laura & Manasse, Paolo, 2005. "Asymmetric Information and Monetary Policy in Common Currency Areas," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(4), pages 603-621, August.
    3. Dmitriev, Mikhail & Hoddenbagh, Jonathan, 2012. "The optimal design of a fiscal union," MPRA Paper 46007, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Apr 2013.
    4. Katrin Ullrich, 2007. "Introducing Instruments of Central Bank Accountability in a Monetary Union," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 239-262, July.
    5. Katrin Elborgh-Woytek & Julian Berengaut, 2006. "Beauty Queens and Wallflowers; Currency Unions in the Middle East and Central Asia," IMF Working Papers 06/226, International Monetary Fund.

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