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Target losses in case of a Euro breakup

Author

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  • Sinn, Hans-Werner

Abstract

Evaluation of the financial costs of a Eurozone breakup depends critically on the interpretation of TARGET balances. While it has been argued that TARGET claims in the Eurozone can be written off without incurring any losses on the claimants as the value of fiat money is independent of the claims of a national central bank, the present paper shows that TARGET claims represent a shift of the ECB's refinancing credit to the crisis countries and thus a claim on the interest return from the commercial banks of these countries. If TARGET claims were to be written off, a loss of real wealth would occur to the amount of the present value of this interest return, which is exactly measured by the amount of the TARGET claims.
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Suggested Citation

  • Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2012. "Target losses in case of a Euro breakup," Munich Reprints in Economics 19622, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenar:19622
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    Cited by:

    1. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2012. "Target Losses in Case of a Euro Breakup," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(04), pages 51-58, December.
    2. Moro, Beniamino, 2019. "Interpreting TARGET balances in the European Monetary Union: A critical review of the literature," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
    3. Huck, Steffen & Valasek, Justin Mattias, 2012. "Institutionalizing eurozone exit: A modified NEWNEY approach," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2012-304, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    4. Eichengreen, Barry & Mehl, Arnaud & Chitu, Livia & Richardson, Gary, 2015. "Mutual Assistance between Federal Reserve Banks: 1913–1960 as Prolegomena to the TARGET2 Debate," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 621-659, September.
    5. Kappius, Robert & Neumärker, Bernhard, 2015. "Could exit rules be self-enforcing in the EU? The cases of France and Germany," The Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers 02-2015, University of Freiburg, Department of Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory.
    6. Koronowski, Adam, . "System dwuwalutowy jako rozwiązanie kryzysu strefy euro," Gospodarka Narodowa-The Polish Journal of Economics, Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie / SGH Warsaw School of Economics, vol. 2014(2).
    7. PhilippineCour-Thimann, 2013. "CESifo Forum Special Issue April 2013: Target Balances and the Crisis in the Euro Area," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 0, pages 05-50, May.
    8. Leszek Balcerowicz, 2014. "Euro Imbalances and Adjustment: A Comparative Analysis," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 34(3), pages 453-482, Fall.
    9. Giuseppe Bertola & John Driffill & Harold James & Hans-Werner Sinn & Jan-Egbert Sturm & Ákos Valentinyi, 2013. "Chapter 4: US Precedents for Europe," EEAG Report on the European Economy, CESifo, vol. 0, pages 95-107, February.
    10. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2018. "Brexit a krize eura: jakou chceme Evropskou unii? [Brexit and the Euro Crisis: What Kind of Union Do We Want?]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2018(1), pages 3-19.
    11. Aitor Erce, 2014. "Cross‐Border Banking, Externalities And Sovereign Distress: Does The Euro Need A Common Banking Authority?," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(3), pages 188-203, July.
    12. Adam Koronowski, 2014. "Dual Currency System as a Solution to the Eurozone Crisis," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 2, pages 5-23.
    13. Potrafke, Niklas & Reischmann, Markus, 2014. "Explosive Target balances of the German Bundesbank," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 439-444.
    14. Pasche, Markus, 2017. "ESBies as a Basis for a TARGET2 Settlement Mechanism," MPRA Paper 83012, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Niklas Potrafke & Markus Reischmann, 2013. "Explosive Target Balances," CESifo Working Paper Series 4297, CESifo.
    16. Stephen Cecchetti & Robert McCauley & Patrick McGuire, 2012. "Interpreting TARGET2 balances," BIS Working Papers 393, Bank for International Settlements.
    17. Heikki Oksanen, 2016. "Smoothing Asymmetric Shocks vs. Redistribution in the Euro Area: A Simple Proposal for Dealing with Mistrust in the Euro Area," CESifo Working Paper Series 5817, CESifo.
    18. Hans-Werner Sinn & Timo Wollmershäuser, 2012. "Target-Salden und die deutsche Kapitalbilanz im Zeichen der europäischen Zahlungsbilanzkrise," ifo Working Paper Series 149, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    19. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2013. "Die Target-Verluste im Fall des Auseinanderbrechens des Euro – Eine Replik auf De Grauwe und Ji," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 66(01), pages 14-24, January.
    20. Hans-Werner Sinn & Timo Wollmershäuser, 2012. "Target Balances and the German Financial Account in Light of the European Balance-of-Payments Crisis," CESifo Working Paper Series 4051, CESifo.
    21. Sergio Cesaratto, 2012. "The endless eurozone crisis, where do we stand? a classical-kaleckian overview," STUDI ECONOMICI, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2012(107), pages 35-63.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

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