Institutionalizing eurozone exit: A modified NEWNEY approach
In this note, we argue that the Eurozone needs an institutional exit mechanism to enhance Eurozone stability, and propose modifications to the Dobbs' NEWNEY mechanism, the only mechanism that satisfies the twin properties of eliminating incentives for intra-Eurozone capital flight and maintaining Eurozone price stability. Our modifications eliminate moral hazard, allow for a fair distribution of costs (between and within countries) and are also appropriate for the exit of a fiscally strong country.
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- Hans-Werner Sinn, 2012.
"Target Losses in Case of a Euro Breakup,"
Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(4), pages 51-58, December.
- Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2012. "Target losses in case of a Euro breakup," Munich Reprints in Economics 19622, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Hans-Werner Sinn, 2012. "Target Losses in Case of a Euro Break-up," CESifo Working Paper Series 3968, CESifo Group Munich.