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The Eurozone needs exit rules

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  • Fahrholz, Christian
  • Wójcik, Cezary

Abstract

This study argues that the key issue for defining and solving the Eurozone’s (EZ) difficulties lies in readjusting the relationship between the centre and the periphery of the EZ. Our argument proceeds in two steps. Firstly, the basic finance problem of a centre-periphery system is captured by a threat game with complete but imperfect information. To get close to the essence of the current EZ sovereign debt crisis we analyse to what extent a ‘troubled’ periphery member can negotiate a bailout from the centre due to the existence of a negative externality arising from its potential default. Secondly, we analyse how establishing ‘exit rules’ would shift the centre-periphery relationship in a way that safeguards the stability of the EZ. We demonstrate that such rules may help limit the scope for brinkmanship whereby fiscal problems in one member state create a negative externality for the rest of the EZ. We then discuss key policy implications concerning financial aspects of the centre-periphery relationship within the EZ.

Suggested Citation

  • Fahrholz, Christian & Wójcik, Cezary, 2013. "The Eurozone needs exit rules," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4665-4674.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:37:y:2013:i:11:p:4665-4674
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.05.016
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    Cited by:

    1. Fahrholz Christian & Freytag Andreas, 2014. "Finanzpolitik in Europa zwischen Subsidiarität und Vergemeinschaftung: Eine ordnungsökonomische Analyse / Between subsidiarity and Europeanization: An ordo-liberal perspective on financial policy," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 65(1), pages 99-116, January.
    2. Kappius, Robert & Neumärker, Bernhard, 2015. "Could exit rules be self-enforcing in the EU? The cases of France and Germany," The Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers 02-2015, University of Freiburg, Department of Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory.
    3. Aleksandra Fedajev & Danijela Pantović & Isidora Milošević & Tamara Vesić & Aleksandra Jovanović & Magdalena Radulescu & Maria Cristina Stefan, 2023. "Evaluating the Outcomes of Monetary and Fiscal Policies in the EU in Times of Crisis: A PLS-SEM Approach," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(11), pages 1-14, May.
    4. Frank A.G. den Butter & Mathieu L.L. Segers, 2014. "Prospects for an EMU between Federalism and Nationalism," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-008/VI, Tinbergen Institute.
    5. Robert Joliet & Rabia Nessah, 2016. "Euro White and Euro Yolk: Sovereign Debt Structure Stability in the Eurozone," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(03), pages 1-15, September.
    6. Christian Fahrholz & Andreas Freytag, 2012. "Will TARGET2-Balances be Reduced again after an End of the Crisis?," Global Financial Markets Working Paper Series 30-2012, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    7. Jürgen Matthes & Thomas Schuster, 2015. "Zum Umgang der Europäischen Währungsunion mit reformunwilligen Eurostaaten," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 68(04), pages 13-18, February.
    8. Christian Fahrholz & Cezary Wójcik, 2012. "The Bail-Out! Positive Political Economics Of Greek-Type Crises In The Emu," Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy (JICEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 3(02), pages 1-18.
    9. Eva Lajtkepová, 2016. "Differences And Similarities In The Indebtedness Of Eu Member States After Last Financial Crisis," Oeconomia Copernicana, Institute of Economic Research, vol. 7(4), pages 551-563, December.
    10. Juneja, Januj, 2017. "How Germany benefits the most from its Eurozone membership," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 1074-1088.
    11. Bernal, Oscar & Gnabo, Jean-Yves & Guilmin, Grégory, 2016. "Economic policy uncertainty and risk spillovers in the Eurozone," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 24-45.

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    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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