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Finanzpolitik in Europa zwischen Subsidiarität und Vergemeinschaftung: Eine ordnungsökonomische Analyse / Between subsidiarity and Europeanization: An ordo-liberal perspective on financial policy

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  • Fahrholz Christian
  • Freytag Andreas

Abstract

There is currently a debate about the Europeanization of financial policies to procure overall economic stability and to ensure the survival of the Eurozone (EZ). The present theoretical survey asks whether and to what extent reassigning national financial policies to European-level control may help safeguard the EZ. The authors argue that establishing a complementary European financial policy may aid in securing a sound formation of the EZ. From an ordo-liberal standpoint, however, a proper institutional system of checks and balances between national and European competences will play a key role in mitigating moral hazard behavior of EZ members; otherwise, such a reassignment of responsibilities would undermine the survival of the EZ. The authors therefore argue in favor of instead strengthening financial policies on the level of European Member States.

Suggested Citation

  • Fahrholz Christian & Freytag Andreas, 2014. "Finanzpolitik in Europa zwischen Subsidiarität und Vergemeinschaftung: Eine ordnungsökonomische Analyse / Between subsidiarity and Europeanization: An ordo-liberal perspective on financial policy," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 65(1), pages 99-116, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:65:y:2014:i:1:p:99-116:n:7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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