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The democratic accountability of the European Central Bank

  • L. BINI-SMAGHI

    (European Central Bank)

Registered author(s):

    The European Central Bank (ECB) is considered to be an institution with a high level of accountability compared with other central banks. However, the matter has yet to be investigated in practice. Accountability of the ECB will have to be checked by governing bodies both within and outside the ECB as well as the public. A survey is undertaken of the main reasons for central bank accountability, especially for the ECB.

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    File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/10593/10477
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    Article provided by Banca Nazionale del Lavoro in its journal Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review.

    Volume (Year): 51 (1998)
    Issue (Month): 205 ()
    Pages: 119-143

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    Handle: RePEc:psl:bnlqrr:1998:22
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    1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1993. "Designing institutions for monetary stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 53-84, December.
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    12. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Seonghwan Oh, 1990. "When and How Much to Talk: Credibility and Flexibility in Monetary Policy With Private Information," UCLA Economics Working Papers 593, UCLA Department of Economics.
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    14. Jakob de Haan, 1997. "The European Central Bank: Independence, accountability and strategy: A review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 395-426, December.
    15. Eijffinger, S-C-W & de Haan, J, 1996. "The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence," Princeton Studies in International Economics 19, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
    16. Goodfriend, Marvin, 1986. "Monetary mystique: Secrecy and central banking," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 63-92, January.
    17. Clive Briault & Andrew Haldane & Mervyn King, 1996. "Independence and Accountability," Bank of England working papers 49, Bank of England.
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