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The European Central Bank: Independence, accountability and strategy: A review

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  • Jakob de Haan

Abstract

This paper reviews research on central banking and monetary policy, with special emphasis on the position of the future European Central Bank. Nowadays, it is often thought that an independent central bank with an explicit mandate to aim for price stability constitutes an important institutional device to assure price stability. Indeed, the ECB will be one of the most independent central banks as follows from the codings of various indicators measuring legal independence. Still, it does not follow straightforwardly from the literature that the Statute of the ECB is optimal. It is also argued that the accountability of the ECB is poorly arranged for in comparison with that of several national central banks. Finally, the discussion about the monetary strategy of the ECB is reviewed. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997

Suggested Citation

  • Jakob de Haan, 1997. "The European Central Bank: Independence, accountability and strategy: A review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 395-426, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:93:y:1997:i:3:p:395-426
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1004972705141
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    Cited by:

    1. Philipp Maier & Saskia Bezoen, 2002. "Central bank bashing: The case of the European Central Bank," MEB Series (discontinued) 2002-18, Netherlands Central Bank, Monetary and Economic Policy Department.
    2. L. Bini-Smaghi, 1998. "The democratic accountability of the European Central Bank," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 51(205), pages 119-143.
    3. Uwe Siegmund & Rolf Hasse & Katja Gerling & Claudia Buch & Werner Sesselmeier & Federico Foders & Norbert Funke & Jakob Haan, 1997. "Book reviews," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 133(1), pages 179-200, March.
    4. Helge Berger & Ulrich Woitek, "undated". "Does Conservatism Matter? A Time Series Approach to Central Banking," Working Papers 9814, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, revised May 1999.
    5. Louis Jaeck & Sehjeong Kim, 2014. "The Impact of EMU Enlargement on Structural Reforms: A Political Economy Approach," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 20(1), pages 73-86, February.
    6. Giandomenico Majone, 2001. "Nonmajoritarian Institutions and the Limits of Democratic Governance: A Political Transaction-Cost Approach," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(1), pages 1-57, March.
    7. Carlo Panico & Francesco Purificato, 2012. "The Role of Institutional and Political Factors in the European Debt Crisis," Working Papers wp280, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
    8. Montserrat Ferre & Carolina Manzano, 2012. "Designing the optimal conservativeness of the central bank," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(2), pages 1461-1473.
    9. Michal Jurek & Pawel Marszalek, 2015. "Policy alternatives for the relationship between ECB monetary and financial policies and new member states," Working papers wpaper112, Financialisation, Economy, Society & Sustainable Development (FESSUD) Project.
    10. repec:kap:iaecre:v:20:y:2014:i:1:p:73-86 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Maier, Philipp & Bezoen, Saskia, 2004. "Bashing and supporting central banks: the Bundesbank and the European Central Bank," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 923-939, November.
    12. L. Bini-Smaghi, 1998. "The democratic accountability of the European Central Bank," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 51(205), pages 119-143.

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