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Ideology and monetary policy: the role of political parties’ stances in the ECB’s parliamentary hearings

Author

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  • Fraccaroli, Nicolò
  • Giovannini, Alessandro
  • Jamet, Jean-Francois
  • Persson, Eric

Abstract

We investigate whether ideology drives the sentiments of parliamentarians when they speak to the central bank they hold accountable. To this end, we collect textual data on the quarterly hearings of the ECB President before the European Parliament from 1999 to 2019. We apply sentiment analysis to more than 1,900 speeches of individual Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from 128 parties. We find robust evidence that MEPs’ sentiments toward the ECB are correlated with the ideological stance predominantly on a pro-/anti-European dimension rather than on a left-right dimension. JEL Classification: E02, E52, E58

Suggested Citation

  • Fraccaroli, Nicolò & Giovannini, Alessandro & Jamet, Jean-Francois & Persson, Eric, 2022. "Ideology and monetary policy: the role of political parties’ stances in the ECB’s parliamentary hearings," Working Paper Series 2655, European Central Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20222655
    Note: 2244726
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central Bank Accountability; Central Bank Independence; Party Ideology; Sentiment Analysis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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