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Assessing the Impact of Changes in Transparency and Accountability at the Bank of Canada

  • Pierre L. Siklos

Inflation targets have clarified the objectives of monetary policy. An objective was to ensure the public would be able to more easily assess monetary policy performance based on the Bank of Canada's record at achieving low and stable inflation. An obvious question then is, as a former governor of the bank stated, whether "public commentary on monetary policy since 1991 has involved a fairer assessment of the performance of the Bank of Canada." Tests, using interest rates, exchange rates, inflation and inflation forecast data, are presented which shed light on this question. Some comparative data from the United Kingdom and the United States are also provided.

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Article provided by University of Toronto Press in its journal Canadian Public Policy.

Volume (Year): 29 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 279-299

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Handle: RePEc:cpp:issued:v:29:y:2003:i:3:p:279-299
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  1. Kari H. Eika & Neil R. Ericsson & Ragnar Nymoen, 1996. "Hazards in implementing a monetary conditions index," International Finance Discussion Papers 568, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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