Monetary policy transparency, public commentary, and market perceptions about monetary policy in Canada
The introduction of inflation targets in Canada in 1991 ostensibly clarified the objectives of monetary policy, namely the pursuit of price stability. In doing so, one of the objectives of the new policy was to ensure that the public would henceforth be able to assess more easily monetary policy performance based on the Bank of Canada's record at achieving low and stable inflation. An obvious question then is to ascertain whether in fact, as the Governor the Bank stated recently, "... public commentary on monetary policy since 1991 has involved a fairer assessment of the performance of the Bank of Canada." Using information compiled on commentary about the Bank of Canada, and monetary policy in general, collected from the Globe and Mail and Financial Post national newspapers, we evaluate how favourable or critical such commentaries have been since 1986. In so doing, we examine a sample before inflation control targets were introduced, as well as the period since. The Bank of Canada also aims to influence expectations and financial market perceptions of its performance. Additional tests, using daily interest rate and exchange rates and monthly inflation and inflation forecast data, are presented which shed light on this question.
|Date of creation:||2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Postfach 10 06 02, 60006 Frankfurt|
Phone: 0 69 / 95 66 - 34 55
Fax: 0 69 / 95 66 30 77
Web page: http://www.bundesbank.de/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dewatripont, Mathias & Jewitt, Ian & Tirole, Jean, 2000. "Multitask agency problems: Focus and task clustering," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 869-877, May.
- Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995.
"The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence,"
9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Eijffinger, S-C-W & de Haan, J, 1996. "The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence," Princeton Studies in International Economics 19, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
- Jon Faust & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1998.
"Transparency and credibility: monetary policy with unobservable goals,"
International Finance Discussion Papers
605, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 2001. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 369-97, May.
- Jon Faust & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," NBER Working Papers 6452, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," CEPR Discussion Papers 1852, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Faust, J. & Svensson, L.E.O., 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," Papers 636, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Svensson, Lars E.O. & Faust, John, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," Seminar Papers 636, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Kari H. Eika & Neil R. Ericsson & Ragnar Nymoen, 1996.
"Hazards in implementing a monetary conditions index,"
International Finance Discussion Papers
568, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Eika, Kari H & Ericsson, Neil R & Nymoen, Ragnar, 1996. "Hazards in Implementing a Monetary Conditions Index," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 58(4), pages 765-90, November.
- Eika, K.H. & Ericsson, N.R. & Nymoen, R., 1996. "Hazards in Implementing a Monetary Conditions Index," Memorandum 32/1996, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Hoeberichts, Marco & Schaling, Eric, 2000.
"A Theory of Central Bank Accountability,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2354, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Neil, Beattie & Fillion, Jean-François, 1999. "An Intraday Analysis of the Effectiveness of Foreign Exchange Intervention," Staff Working Papers 99-4, Bank of Canada.
- Cukierman, A., 2000. "Accountability, Credibility, Transparency and Stabilization Policy in the Eurosystem," Papers 2000-4, Tel Aviv.
- Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
- Willem H. Buiter, 1999.
"Alice in Euroland,"
Journal of Common Market Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 181-209, 06.
- Banaian, King & Burdekin, Richard C K & Willett, Thomas D, 1998. "Reconsidering the Principal Components of Central Bank Independence: The More the Merrier?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(1-2), pages 1-12, October.
- Clive Briault & Andrew Haldane & Mervyn King, 1996. "Independence and Accountability," Bank of England working papers 49, Bank of England.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:bubdp1:4144. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.