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Effects of transparency, monetary policy signalling and clarity of central bank communication on disagreement about inflation expectations

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  • G. C. Montes
  • L. V. Oliveira
  • A. Curi
  • R. T. F. Nicolay

Abstract

The literature on transparency and central bank communication and the literature on disagreement about expectations are evolving; however, both have been evolving separately. Despite the advances in the literature, several key issues remain open and there are gaps to be filled. Therefore, this study analyses the effects of monetary policy signalling and clarity of central bank communication on disagreement about inflation expectations. It also investigates whether greater transparency coincides with lower levels of disagreement in inflation expectations in Brazil. The findings suggest that transparency is important to reduce disagreement about inflation expectations. Moreover, our estimates indicate that central bank communication and clarity affect disagreement about inflation expectations in Brazil.

Suggested Citation

  • G. C. Montes & L. V. Oliveira & A. Curi & R. T. F. Nicolay, 2016. "Effects of transparency, monetary policy signalling and clarity of central bank communication on disagreement about inflation expectations," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(7), pages 590-607, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:48:y:2016:i:7:p:590-607
    DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2015.1083091
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Montes, Gabriel Caldas & Nicolay, Rodolfo Tomás da Fonseca & Acar, Tatiana, 2019. "Do fiscal communication and clarity of fiscal announcements affect public debt uncertainty? Evidence from Brazil," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 38-60.
    2. Gabriel Caldas Montes & Tatiana Acar, 2018. "Fiscal credibility and disagreement in expectations about inflation: evidence for Brazil," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(2), pages 826-843.
    3. Montes, Gabriel Caldas & Luna, Paulo Henrique, 2018. "Discretionary fiscal policy and disagreement in expectations about fiscal variables empirical evidence from Brazil," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 100-116.
    4. Giacomo Caterini, 2020. "La comunicazione della Banca Centrale dei Caraibi Orientali: un?analisi testuale (On the communication of the Eastern Caribbeans Central Bank: A textual analysis)," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 73(289), pages 57-82.
    5. G. C. Montes & R. T. F. Nicolay, 2017. "Does clarity of central bank communication affect credibility? Evidences considering governor-specific effects," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(32), pages 3163-3180, July.
    6. Ruttachai Seelajaroen & Pornanong Budsaratragoon & Boonlert Jitmaneeroj, 2020. "Do monetary policy transparency and central bank communication reduce interest rate disagreement?," Journal of Forecasting, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 39(3), pages 368-393, April.
    7. Juan Camilo Galvis Ciro & Juan Camilo Anzoátegui Zapata, 2019. "Disagreement in inflation expectations: empirical evidence for Colombia," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(40), pages 4411-4424, August.
    8. Gabriel Caldas Montes & Caio Ferrari Ferreira, 2019. "Does monetary policy credibility mitigate the effects of uncertainty about exchange rate on uncertainties about both inflation and interest rate?," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 649-678, October.
    9. Montes, Gabriel Caldas & da Cunha Lima, Luiza Leitão, 2018. "Effects of fiscal transparency on inflation and inflation expectations: Empirical evidence from developed and developing countries," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 26-37.
    10. Boonlert Jitmaneeroj & Michael Lamla, 2018. "The Implications of Central Bank Transparency for Uncertainty and Disagreement," KOF Working papers 18-445, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
    11. Jitmaneeroj, Boonlert & Lamla, Michael J. & Wood, Andrew, 2019. "The implications of central bank transparency for uncertainty and disagreement," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 222-240.
    12. Montes, Gabriel Caldas & Curi, Alexandre, 2017. "Disagreement in expectations about public debt, monetary policy credibility and inflation risk premium," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 46-61.
    13. de Mendonça, Helder Ferreira, 2018. "Credibility and Inflation Expectations: What we can tell from seven emerging economies?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 1165-1181.
    14. Montes, Gabriel Caldas & Souza, Ivan, 2020. "Sovereign default risk, debt uncertainty and fiscal credibility: The case of Brazil," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).

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